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INTRODUCTION
Tony, an eleven-year-old boy, and his father, Mr. Johnson, meet with an
attorney to discuss possible legal representation in connection with Tony’s
special education needs. If the attorney accepts the case, who will she
represent? Is her client Tony, Mr. Johnson, or both? Is the attorney limited
to zealous representation of the expressed interests of her client or clients,
or are her own views as to what may be in Tony’s best interests relevant?
What happens if Tony and Mr. Johnson disagree about the best course of
action? If the attorney represents Tony exclusively and litigation is
required, would an administrative hearing officer recognize Tony’s legal
capacity, as a minor, to bring an administrative due process complaint,
without the involvement of Mr. Johnson or another adult? If a civil action
is required in a state or federal court to enforce Tony’s special education
rights, would he have the capacity to sue, in the court’s view, without the
involvement of Mr. Johnson or another adult acting on his behalf? What
happens if Tony actually lives with his grandmother, not Mr. Johnson, and
his grandmother is his primary caregiver? In that case, would his
grandmother serve as a client? Figuring out who the client is may be
obvious in many other areas of law, but there can be significant ambiguity
in determining which individual is serving as the client when a child’s
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interests are at stake,1 an ambiguity that is amplified in special education
cases, in which a parent’s interests are also central.2
This Article explores the various models of representation used by
attorneys in special education cases and advocates for thoughtful
identification of the client or clients through a contextualized,
individualized decision made collaboratively by the lawyer and client(s),
with considerations of a panoply of factors. Part I attempts to unpack these
models. While clear advantages exist with each of the models, the Article
presents case examples and questions that illustrate some of the challenges
that may be presented by each model.3 Part II includes a discussion of the
factors that an attorney should consider in each case in determining the
appropriate model of representation.4 These factors reveal the legal,
ethical, and practical challenges in selecting a model of representation. The
rights of parents, including their rights to make decisions on behalf of their
children more generally and in relation to their children’s special education
needs in particular, affect the decision to select a particular model of
representation. Challenges related to identification of the “parent” or
educational decision-maker under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) also play a role.5 Questions as to whether
administrative hearing officers and courts view a minor child as having the
capacity to bring an administrative due process complaint or civil action in
a special education case should also factor into an attorney’s assessment, as
should expectations regarding the attorney-client relationship by the child,
parents, and other individuals, such as school officials. Other factors such
as the characteristics, capacity and age of the child, potential conflicts of
interest between the parent and child, and the implications for attorneyclient confidentiality should be considered in selecting a model of
representation for each case. Similarly, involvement by the family in child
welfare proceedings or by the youth in delinquency proceedings influences
the model of representation that is used. This section includes an analysis
of these factors and the roles they should play in an attorney’s evaluation of
the appropriate model of representation in a particular case.
In Part III, the Article provides several recommendations to facilitate the
effective identification of the client or clients in a special education case.6

1. See Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interests in the Representation of Children,
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1819, 1826-28 (1996).
2. See Jillian Petrera, The Ethical Dilemma of a Special Education Lawyer: Who
is the Client?, 31 PACE L. REV. 531, 531-34 (2011).
3. See infra Part I.
4. See infra Part II.
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2006).
6. See infra Part III.
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The Article recommends that attorneys, in partnership with their potential
clients, thoughtfully identify the client or clients in a special education
matter, clearly communicate the chosen model to all family members, and
remain aware of any potential or existing conflicts among clients where
joint representation is used. Finally, the Article emphasizes the importance
of clear communication about the role of each person and ultimate loyalty
to the identified client, but also advocates for the involvement and
empowerment of both parent and child in the representation, wherever
possible.
The IDEA is a federal special education statute that guarantees that all
children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public
education (FAPE) that is designed to meet their unique needs.7 In addition
to conferring significant substantive rights to children with disabilities, the
statute also provides parents with a number of important rights. Under the
IDEA, school districts have an affirmative obligation to identify, locate,
and evaluate any students who are suspected of having a disability to
determine if they qualify as eligible for special education services under the
IDEA.8 A parent or a teacher can refer a child for special education
evaluations.9 Parental consent is then required before an educational
agency can evaluate a child.10 After the evaluation is completed, a team of
individuals, including the parent, convenes to determine whether the
student has a disability that is covered by the IDEA and whether the student
requires special education services.11
Once a child is found eligible for special education services, the team
meets to develop an Individualized Education Program (IEP).12 An IEP is
a written plan that documents information about the child’s unique needs,
the special education and related services that the child will receive, and the
educational placement selected by the team.13 IEPs must be reviewed
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006). For useful background on the special
education statutory and regulatory scheme, see Ruth Colker, A Brief Overview, in
SPECIAL EDUCATION ADVOCACY 1-4 (Ruth Colker & Julie K. Waterstone eds., Lexis
2011).
8. § 1400.
9. § 1414(a)(1)(B).
10. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I).
11. § 1414(b)(4)-(5). A child is qualified as disabled under the IDEA if he or she
has an intellectual disability, hearing impairment, speech or language impairment,
visual impairment, serious emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairment, autism,
traumatic brain injury, other health impairment, and/or specific learning disabilities that
are affecting his or her education. Id. § 1401(3)(A)(i).
12. § 1414(d)(1)(A)-(B); see Stephen A. Rosenbaum, When It’s Not Apparent:
Some Modest Advice to Parent Advocates for Students with Disabilities, 5 U.C. DAVIS
J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 159, 162 (2001) (defining an “IEP” as a written statement describing
a child’s needs and the special education services that will be provided for that child).
13. 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a) (2011).
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annually to assess the level of success of their implementation and to make
any necessary modifications in order to meet the child’s current needs.14 If
the parent disagrees with any matter relating to the identification,
evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a
FAPE, the parent can bring a complaint for an impartial administrative due
process hearing.15 Parents who are not satisfied with the result of a due
process hearing can bring a civil action in federal court.16
As the IDEA confers rights on both the parent and the child, the
ambiguity may be intensified as to who is serving in the client role when a
family seeks legal representation from a special education attorney.17
Although the IDEA provides that the child has a right to a free and
appropriate public education, one of the statute’s stated purposes is “to
ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such
children are protected.”18 In interpreting this statement, the Supreme Court
explained that “the word ‘rights’ in the quoted language refers to the rights
of parents as well as the rights of the child; otherwise the grammatical
structure would make no sense.”19 Because the statute references the rights
of both the parents and the child, it may be unclear to attorneys who their
client is or should be in a special education matter. As a result, there has
been some debate in the field of special education advocacy as to whether
the client is the child, the parent, or both.20
I. MODELS OF REPRESENTATION IN SPECIAL EDUCATION CASES
Attorneys in special education cases use a variety of different models of
representation. Many attorneys represent the parent or a qualified caregiver
exclusively, while other attorneys represent the parent and child together.
Some attorneys instead represent solely the child with an “expressed
interests” model, while other attorneys use a model in which they advocate

14. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(ii).
15. § 1415(b)(6)(A).
16. § 1415(i)(2); see also § 1415(g)(1)-(2) (if the state has a two-tiered

administrative procedure then the parent must appeal to the state educational agency
first before the parent will be able to appeal the decision in federal court).
17. See generally Rosenbaum, supra note 12.
18. § 1400(d)(1)(A)-(B) (emphasis added).
19. Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 528
(2007).
20. See Cynthia Godsoe, All in the Family: Towards a New Representational
Model for Parents and Children, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 303 (2011) [hereinafter
Godsoe, All in the Family]; Petrera, supra note 2, at 531; Suzanne Rabe & Stephen A.
Rosenbaum, A “Sending Down” Sabbatical: The Benefits of Lawyering in the Legal
Services Trenches, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 296, 303 n.30 (2010); Kim Brooks Tandy &
Teresa Heffernan, Representing Children with Disabilities: Legal and Ethical
Considerations, 6 NEV. L.J. 1396 (2006).
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for the “best interests” of the child.21 For children who are involved in
either the neglect or delinquency systems, the court may appoint an
attorney to handle the related special education matter. For these attorneys,
there may be limitations imposed by a statute other than the IDEA, nonspecial education regulations, court rules, or judicial instruction as to the
model of representation these attorneys should use in their cases.
A. Parent as Client
Many attorneys choose to represent parents exclusively in special
education matters, without formally including the child as a client.22 As
discussed below, special education rights under the IDEA are designed to
benefit the student with a disability, but the statute also gives parents
independent rights and empowers them to enforce their rights.23 Many
lawyers will conduct intake interviews exclusively with the parent and, as a
practical matter, will direct most, if not all, communications to the parent or
guardian of a minor rather than the minor child herself.24
There are a variety of reasons why an attorney might choose a model of
representation in which the parent—or an individual serving in the role of
parent under the IDEA—is the sole client. Representing a child in any
matter can be challenging, particularly where the child might have
difficulty understanding complicated legal concepts or the needs that flow
from her disability, expressing her preferences, or maintaining consistency
in her decisions. An attorney might also elect to represent the parent
exclusively to avoid joint representation of the parent and child because

21. See Emily Buss, “You’re My What?” The Problem of Children’s
Misperceptions of Their Lawyers’ Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1700 (1996)
(defining the “expressed interests” model as advocating for what the child wants versus
the “best interest” model, where the attorney’s strategy is an independent determination
of what is in the best interest of the child).
22. Joseph B. Tulman, Using Special Education Advocacy to Avoid or Resolve
Status Offense Charges, in REPRESENTING JUVENILE STATUS OFFENDERS 99 (Sally
Small Inada & Claire S. Chiamulera eds., 2010) [hereinafter Tulman, Special
Education Advocacy and Status Offense Charges] (“Ordinarily, the parent is the client
in a special education matter.”); Godsoe, All in the Family, supra note 20, at 15
(“Because most cases are initiated by a parent who privately retains counsel, most
attorneys in these cases represent parents.”); see also Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of
Students R.J., 585 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1211 n.1 (D. Or. 2008) (“[The] attorney in an
IDEA case usually represents the parents.”).
23. Tulman, Special Education Advocacy and Status Offense Charges, supra note
22, at 99.
24. See, e.g., Rabe & Rosenbaum, supra note 20, at 303 (noting that
communication is almost always between an attorney and the child’s parent or guardian
at the legal services organization Disability Rights California); see also Godsoe, All in
the Family, supra note 20, at 14-15 (“Many attorneys representing parents, and paid by
parents, interpret parents’ rights to direct a child’s education as meaning that they
should not consult with even older children about educational placement . . . they do
not interview or regularly meet with children.”).
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such a model clashes with the individualistic structure of attorney practice
standards and ethical rules, which presume the attorney’s undivided loyalty
to a singular, easily identifiable client.25 Parents are accorded decisionmaking rights both constitutionally and statutorily as prescribed by the
IDEA, and parents clearly have the capacity to sue in administrative due
process hearings and civil actions under the IDEA, unlike minor children,
as described extensively below. While there may be clear advantages to a
parent-as-client model of representation, the decision to represent a parent
exclusively in a special education matter involves a variety of legal and
ethical considerations and consequences.
Imagine a situation in which Ms. Jones approached an attorney seeking
representation in connection with her daughter Brandy’s special education
needs.26 Brandy was fifteen years old and was exposed to alcohol and
drugs in utero. She suffered delays in her development as a result, and
came into foster care at a young age. Ms. Jones adopted Brandy after
serving as her foster mother and was concerned that Brandy was failing in
school. A recent psychological evaluation confirmed that Brandy required
intensive special education services due to her severe learning disabilities
and emotional disturbance. She was not receiving the special education
services she required to make academic progress. Ms. Jones came to the
attorney for legal help, and the attorney signed a retainer with Ms. Jones,
but not with Brandy, as the attorney’s legal services organization had a
clear policy of representing parents or other adult caregivers in special
education matters. Even outside that legal services organization, most
special education attorneys in the attorney’s jurisdiction used a similar
model of representation, in which the parent or caregiver alone plays the
role of client, as special education hearing officers in that jurisdiction had
not recognized a minor child as having the capacity to sue in a due process
hearing.
At the direction of the client Ms. Jones, the attorney helped Brandy get
placed into an intensive special education school to address her severe
learning disabilities and secured mental health services to help stabilize
Brandy at home. Brandy wanted these services and thought they would
help her, but they seemed to amount to too little, too late. Brandy failed the
tenth grade, destroyed furniture at school one day in a fit of rage, was

25. See Godsoe, All in the Family, supra note 20, at 4 (explaining that the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and other practice standards presume the
attorney’s undivided loyalty to her client, disfavor joint representation and make no
exception for family relationships).
26. These client stories are representative of the challenges that the author
confronted while working with clients in her legal practice. Some of these situations
are loosely based on real client stories, with names and facts altered to protect the
identity of the individuals.

CANNON 9/15/2011

8

12/8/2011 12:49:08 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 20:1

arrested for assaulting another family member, and threatened to kill
herself. Ms. Jones was extremely worried about Brandy’s safety and the
safety of others, including the safety of other family members.
Ms. Jones took Brandy to psychiatrists and psychologists, in a desperate
search for answers that would help stabilize Brandy. As Brandy’s situation
worsened, the psychiatrists and psychologists all made the same
recommendations. They told Ms. Jones that Brandy was in a state of crisis,
and that she urgently required residential treatment in order to receive
intensive mental health care before she hurt herself or someone else. The
teachers and counselors at Brandy’s school agreed; for now, they did not
think that she could make academic progress in a less restrictive setting
than a residential treatment facility. They told Ms. Jones that an
appropriate residential treatment facility for Brandy would not only provide
Brandy with therapeutic services, but also with the special education
services she needed to address her learning disabilities. Upon hearing the
recommendations of the health and school professionals she trusted, Ms.
Jones made up her mind. She did not feel that Brandy could be safe in her
home or in the community, and she asked the attorney to help her find a
residential placement for Brandy and obtain funding from the school
district for Brandy to attend the program as her special education
placement. The attorney was worried about Ms. Jones’s decision.
Although Brandy was struggling greatly at home and at school, despite
receiving very intensive services in both places, residential treatment is
extremely restrictive and greatly limits the independence of its participants.
There are horror stories about aversive therapies used with children in such
programs, and abuse, neglect, and overmedication of children at such
facilities are all too common.27 The attorney counseled Ms. Jones about

27. See, e.g., UNIV. LEGAL SERS., OUT OF STATE, OUT OF MIND: THE HIDDEN LIVES

D.C. YOUTH IN RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT CENTERS 5-9 (2009), available at
http://www.ulsdc.org/out%20of%20state%20out%20of%20mind%20revision%20final.pdf.
Some
scholars argue that any parent advocating for a residential placement for her child is
arguably acting against her child’s legal interests in a free appropriate legal education
in the least restrictive environment, and that attorneys advocating for residential
treatment for a child are failing to recognize the conflict between parent and child, and
violating the requirement that they advocate for the least restrictive environment for
clients with diminished capacity. Godsoe, All in the Family, supra note 20, at 24. The
evidence shows that residential treatment for youth is often not effective. See ROBERT
BRAME ET AL., RESEARCH ON PATHWAYS TO DESISTANCE (2009), available at
http://www.macfound.org/atf/cf/%7Bb0386ce3-8b29-4162-8098e466fb856794%7D/PATHWAYSREPORT.pdf. While attorneys should counsel their
clients about the risks and restrictiveness of such treatment and any legal entitlements
to community-based alternatives, it is unclear what ethical duties an attorney has to a
non-client child where the model of representation used by the attorney is one in which
the parent is exclusively the client. Moreover, some youth express an interest in
participating in residential treatment, especially where such treatment might provide an
alternative to a more punitive placement such as a juvenile detention center or prison.
OF
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other less restrictive options which would allow Brandy to remain at home,
but Ms. Jones was terrified that Brandy would attempt suicide, hurt
someone else, or end up incarcerated if she did not find Brandy a
residential placement immediately. She hoped that Brandy’s stay at the
program would be short, but she felt that she had no choice but to listen to
the recommendations of the doctors and school officials.
Because her client was clear about the decision and would not change
her mind despite strong counseling, the attorney located a residential
treatment center with a good reputation that was not too far from the Jones’
home. The staff of the center assured the attorney and Ms. Jones that the
center could provide Brandy with both the mental health treatment that she
required and special education services to address her learning disabilities.
Ms. Jones and the attorney talked with Brandy about Ms. Jones’s plan and
the residential treatment center that the attorney had identified. Brandy
was adamant—she did not want to go to a residential treatment center, even
for a few months. She wanted to stay at home with Ms. Jones, the only
parent she had ever known.
The attorney felt even more hesitant about the idea of Brandy going into
residential treatment. If Brandy did not want to go to such a program, the
attorney wondered how she could advocate for funding from the school
district for this type of special education placement. With Brandy and Ms.
Jones, there was no question as to who was the client. Ms. Jones was the
client, and the lawyer’s job was to carry out her wishes, within the bounds
of the law and the retainer agreement. But how could the attorney ignore
Brandy’s disagreement with Ms. Jones’s decision, especially given that
Brandy was the one who would have to live with the consequences? How
could the attorney be expected to shake her concerns about residential
treatment more generally and the nagging feeling that Ms. Jones’s decision
might not be the best one? Might a liberty interest of Brandy’s be at stake
here? Through their advocacy for a residential placement, would the
attorney and Ms. Jones be violating Brandy’s liberty interest in remaining
out of an institutional, congregate care facility and in her home and
community? Or did Ms. Jones’s parental right to make decisions about
Brandy’s care and education, or her role as the client, and only client, in
this matter mean that the attorney had no choice but to advocate zealously
for Ms. Jones’s position? Pursuant to a model in which the parent is the
sole client, even though it is clear who should be directing the
representation, an attorney exclusively representing a parent may struggle
with different aspects of the special education representation.
B. Parent and Child as Joint Clients
An attorney could instead choose to represent both the parent and child,
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with both individuals directing the attorney throughout the course of the
case. Joint representation can have the advantage of providing both the
parent and child with a voice in the special education process, as both have
recognized rights and a strong stake in the special education process.28 An
attorney who represents both the parent and student can protect the rights
of both individuals, without disenfranchising one or the other.29 A joint
model of representation can help involve both the parent and student in
shaping the student’s education, which can also empower each of them to
become better informed, effective self-advocates in the long-term even
after the representation has concluded.30 Additionally, both the parent and
student have important information, opinions, and views that can assist the
attorney in providing adequate and effective representation if both serve as
clients.31
However, an attorney using this model might confront a number of
challenges, such as a conflict of interest between the two clients.32 Imagine
that an attorney represented a fourteen-year-old girl named Emily and her
mother, Ms. Stewart. In the first meeting with the attorney, Ms. Stewart
and Emily sat together on a couch, while Ms. Stewart talked about Emily’s
academic failures as if her daughter were not in the room. Emily stared off
into the distance. The attorney requested to spend some time alone with
Emily during that first meeting, and Ms. Stewart agreed, wanting to make
sure Emily could get to know and trust the attorney. In speaking to Emily
alone, the attorney quickly learned that Emily hated school, but was not
sure why or what she needed to improve her educational experience. The
attorney signed a retainer agreement with both Emily and Ms. Stewart,
promising to assist them in securing appropriate educational services for
Emily.
After some investigation into Emily’s school records and psychological
evaluations, the attorney learned that Emily was recently diagnosed with a
mild intellectual disability.33 Her school was not providing her with the
28. See Godsoe, All in the Family, supra note 20, at 40 (advocating for a new type
of family representation in special education cases).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 41.
32. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2011) (describing the
prohibition on representing two clients whose interests conflict).
33. The IDEA still refers to the disability classification of “mental retardation”;
however, this term has commonly fallen out of favor and the term “intellectual
disability” is now preferable. In fact, the American Association on Mental Retardation
changed its name in 2007 to the American Association on Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities. See AM. ASS’N ON INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES
FAQ
ON
INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITY,
http://www.aaidd.org/content_104.cfm (last visited Apr. 29, 2011).
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required services and accommodations to address her disability, resulting in
academic failures. The evidence was there: Emily could qualify for special
education services under the IDEA as a child with “Mental Retardation.”34
With the support of the conclusions and recommendations from a recent
psychological evaluation, Emily would qualify for an IEP that would
include specialized instruction and certain accommodations, such as
preferential seating and extra time on tests. There was no doubt in the
attorney’s mind that Emily could benefit from these services and
accommodations, and Ms. Stewart agreed. Both Ms. Stewart and the
attorney were hopeful that these special education services and
accommodations would give Emily the help that she needed to improve her
grades and begin to enjoy school.
The attorney sat down with Emily to discuss these options. She balked
at the entire plan, especially the special education disability classification
of “Mental Retardation.” Even when counseled by the attorney as to the
benefits she could derive from an IEP, Emily insisted that she did not
belong in special education and asserted that she just simply hated school,
like lots of other teenagers, and just wanted to be left alone. However, Ms.
Stewart was insistent that she wanted to pursue an IEP for Emily, with the
specialized instruction and accommodations recommended in the recent
psychological evaluation. The attorney tried to get them to come to an
agreement, but neither mother nor daughter would change her mind.
During this process, the attorney struggled with the idea of playing
mediator between two clients. The attorney was concerned about what
would happen if Ms. Stewart and Emily could not resolve their conflict,
worrying that she might need to terminate the representation, leaving the
family without a lawyer.35 As a legal representative of both Emily and Ms.
Stewart, what should the attorney have done? Emily wanted one thing and
Ms. Stewart another, but they were both the attorney’s clients and the
attorney had a duty to advocate zealously on behalf of both of them. Could
the attorney have sided with one or the other? Did it matter what the
attorney thought was best for Emily? How could the attorney practice
“client-centered representation”36 if the clients could not provide the
34. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(6) (2011).
35. See Tandy & Heffernan, supra note 20, at 1403-05 (noting that an attorney’s

early detection of divergent goals between parents and children can result in more
successful client counseling and representation).
36. Client-centered representation emphasizes “the client as the prime decisionmaker in the lawyer-client relationship and the person who decides the objectives of the
representation. The lawyer’s role, then, is a helping one, in which the client ultimately
decides the objectives of the representation.” STEPHEN ELLMANN ET AL., Critical
Issues in Interviewing and Counseling, in LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN
INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 6 (2009); see also Stanley S. Herr, Capacity for and
Consent to Legal Representation, in A GUIDE TO CONSENT, 77, 79-80 (Robert D.
Dinerstein et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter Herr, Legal Representation] (discussing client-
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attorney with direction with one voice? Would the attorney have needed to
terminate the representation, leaving both Emily and her mother without a
lawyer, if the conflict could not be resolved? Despite the advantages of
joint representation in a special education matter, significant challenges
related to the representation may still present themselves.
C. Child as Client
In a special education matter, the child is the subject of the case. But
should the child serve as the client in a special education case? As detailed
below, in most cases where children have reached the age of majority, they
will take over those rights that previously belonged to their parents under
the IDEA and the parents will not retain any rights under the statute.37
Therefore, in most situations in which a student has reached the age of
majority and the rights previously belonging to the parent are transferred to
that student, exclusive representation of the student, without involvement
by the parent in the representation, is a clearer choice. However, an
attorney representing a student who has reached the age of majority may
still face challenges in the representation. For example, what if a court has
appointed the mother of a nineteen-year-old student to serve as his guardian
based on the court’s determination that he is incompetent to make decisions
on his own behalf? Even where there is no such determination from a
court, how will the attorney take direction from a twenty-year-old client
with severe autism who is nonverbal?
Some attorneys might also choose to represent minor students, even
before they reach the age of majority and obtain full decision-making rights
under the IDEA. Where a minor child is the sole client, the attorney may
elicit information or opinions from the parent, but would typically aim to
protect the goals as established by the child-client.38 If an attorney
represents a minor child exclusively, this model of representation has the
strong benefit of providing the child with a real voice in the special
education process and a sense of agency and empowerment in making
decisions regarding educational programming. The voices of children,
especially those with disabilities, often go unheard in matters affecting their
own lives, even when they have legal representation.39 An attorney who
centered representation on behalf of individuals with disability).
37. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m); 34 C.F.R. § 300.520.
38. See Tandy & Heffernan, supra note 20, at 1407 (noting that parental
participation, when elicited, should be done so in a manner that preserves the goals of
the child-client).
39. “Too often, lawyers, when faced with clients who are ‘different’ intellectually
or from the standpoint of age, believe that they must act so as to do what is best for the
client rather than what the client says he or she wants. Such a protective and
paternalistic approach to one’s clients is problematic from a number of perspectives,
not the least of which is the denial of the client’s capacity to make his or her own
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can effectively represent a minor child exclusively can help the child
overcome this disempowerment and disenfranchisement, and make sure
that the child’s interests and core rights to a free and appropriate public
education are truly protected. Moreover, a lawyer representing the student
in a special education case might be in a better position to mediate the
conflict between the parents and the school district40 by standing distinct
from either entity and perhaps gaining some legitimacy in the eyes of the
school district, a hearing officer, or a court, by serving the interests of the
child, rather than the parent, whose interests might not be viewed as
sympathetically.
Before the student reaches the age of majority, there are a number of
factors that might influence an attorney’s decision as to whether to
represent that child exclusively. These factors include age; competency;
maturity of the child; whether the child has the capacity to sue should
litigation be necessary in the special education matter; the implications for
a delinquency or abuse/neglect case, if applicable; and the role and rights of
the parent in a special education case.41 These factors, as well as others
discussed below, might create challenges in effectuating a model of
representation in which the child is the sole client. For example, can a fiveyear-old child direct his legal representation in a special education matter?
What about a sixteen-year-old child with a severe intellectual disability
who is nonverbal? Can the attorney in that situation determine the
educational program that is in the child’s best interests or substitute her
own judgment as to what the child would want if she could express
herself?42 Does the model of representation change if the parent is the one
who retained the attorney and is paying for the representation? What if a
fifteen-year-old client is choosing to attend a particular school that will not
meet his special education needs simply because his girlfriend attends that
school?
Should the attorney advocate for that client’s position?
Alternatively, if the attorney represents an eleven-year-old child, that child
might be able to direct the representation, but would a hearing officer view
her as having the capacity to sue as the named complainant in an
administrative due process hearing or a civil action in court without
involvement of a parent or guardian?
Imagine that a sixteen-year-old named Jimmy was charged with
possession of marijuana. In reviewing his court-ordered psychological
decisions . . . .” ELLMANN ET AL., supra note 36, at 110.
40. See Petrera, supra note 2, at 545 (“[W]hen the child is the client, a lawyer is in
a better position to mediate the conflict between the parents and the school district.”).
41. See Tandy & Hefferman, supra note 20, at 1406-07 (citing Recommendations
of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1301, 1312 (1996)).
42. See id. at 1405-07.
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evaluation, his public defender noted that he had been diagnosed with
autism. The public defender, who represented Jimmy exclusively without
any involvement from a parent in the delinquency matter in juvenile court,
ran into some challenges during the attorney-client relationship because
Jimmy did not speak very much and, when he did speak, he used short,
simple sentences that made it difficult for her to discern Jimmy’s goals and
preferences. She was able to learn from him that he wanted the court case
to be done with as soon as possible, even if it meant he had to participate in
an inpatient addiction program. She identified a six-month inpatient
program where Jimmy could receive addiction counseling. The alternative
was a year-long outpatient program, during which he could live at home
and remain in the community. If he completed the inpatient program
successfully, he could get out of court supervision and have the
delinquency case behind him in only six months, whereas the outpatient
program would require him to remain under court supervision for a year.
When presented with these two options, Jimmy indicated a preference for
the six-month inpatient program because he wanted to participate in the
shortest possible program.
In further investigating the case, the public defender learned that Jimmy
was receiving no special education services and was failing school. She
referred Jimmy to a special education attorney who also worked for the
public defender organization. The special education attorney investigated
the inpatient program and learned that it did not offer any special education
services to address Jimmy’s autism. Without special education services at
the inpatient program, he would fall even further behind in school, and a
high school diploma would be even further out of reach. After six months
away from school, without any special education services, he would
probably need to repeat the tenth grade all over again. The special
education attorney scheduled a meeting with Jimmy and his father, Mr.
Campbell to discuss next steps. She explained what she learned, and
advised Jimmy and Mr. Campbell that although it might require an
administrative due process hearing, if Jimmy chose the year-long outpatient
program that allowed him to stay in the community, she could advocate to
secure special education services at Jimmy’s high school so that he could
start making progress in school and continue working towards his diploma
without interruption. Although he would be under court supervision
longer, the special education attorney explained to Jimmy that he could
begin to catch up in school and avoid repeating the tenth grade, making the
possibility of graduating with a high school diploma far more likely, if he
attended the outpatient program. Jimmy shrugged and mumbled that he
wanted to get his addiction counseling over with in the inpatient program.
The special education attorney, however, was concerned that Jimmy did
not truly understand the implications of that decision.
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Mr. Campbell preferred to have Jimmy stay at home, attend the
outpatient program, and receive special education services at his high
school. Mr. Campbell was concerned that Jimmy would have a hard time
readjusting to life at home and at school if he was away for six months.
Jimmy’s public defender planned to advocate at his next delinquency
hearing in juvenile court for the six-month inpatient program, at Jimmy’s
direction. Pursuant to the public defender organization’s policy, the special
education attorney represented Jimmy’s expressed interests exclusively.
What position should the special education attorney take? Is she able to
consider Mr. Campbell’s opinion in any way, even though it conflicts with
Jimmy’s position in the delinquency matter? Does she have any
opportunity to deviate from Jimmy’s expressed interests as a result of his
autism? Should her concern that Jimmy did not fully understand the
decision he was making affect her actions? Similarly, should she act on her
concern that his position is not in his best interests? If an administrative
due process complaint is warranted in order to secure appropriate special
education services for Jimmy, could he, as a minor, bring the complaint on
his own? Or would Mr. Campbell need to bring the complaint on Jimmy’s
behalf in order for Jimmy to have capacity to sue in the view of the hearing
officer? Such challenges may present themselves when an attorney
exclusively represents a minor child in a special education matter.
Whether an attorney represents a parent exclusively, jointly represents a
parent or parents and child, or represents a child exclusively, each model of
representation has both advantages and challenges. A variety of factors, if
carefully considered, can help attorneys identify the appropriate model of
representation for a particular situation and avoid any obstacles.
Thoughtful identification of the client or clients in a special education
matter, with clear communication of that model to all parties, can help to
minimize some of the challenges illustrated in the cases above. Where
challenges do still present themselves during the course of the
representation, thorough consideration of the factors below can also assist
attorneys and their clients in effectively tackling such obstacles.
II. FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN SELECTING A MODEL OF REPRESENTATION
A. The Rights of Parents
1. The Rights of Parents to Make Decisions on Behalf of Their Children
Courts have recognized that parents are not only uniquely qualified, but
also have a constitutional right, to make decisions on behalf of their minor
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children.43 From the Supreme Court’s explicit recognition of parental
rights44 and a belief that parents typically act in the best interests of their
children,45 parents have the authority to make decisions concerning the
medical, moral, educational, and financial welfare of their children.46 The
Court has underscored the long-held principle of the “liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control.”47 In particular, the Court has emphasized, “it is cardinal with us
that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parent,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations
the state can neither supply nor hinder.”48 As such, “. . . the ‘liberty’
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right . . . to
direct the education and upbringing of one’s children.”49 Because the role
of “parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond
debate as an enduring American tradition,”50 the rights of parents to make
decisions related to their children’s special education needs—and therefore
to serve as the client in directing an attorney in a special education case—
should be considered by special education attorneys contemplating an
appropriate model of representation in a particular matter.
Unless their rights are restricted or terminated by a court, there is a
presumption that parents are the appropriate decision-makers for their
children.51 Accordingly, a parent typically maintains the authority to make
decisions about his or child’s well-being under the assumption that the
parent can and will act in the child’s best interest.52 Parents, or caregivers
in a parental role, are also often the best-situated adults to determine their
43. See, e.g., Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 628 n.13 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 1340 (1985)) (invalidating federal regulations requiring
medical treatment for infants with disabilities without parental consent).
44. The Court has acknowledged the “fundamental liberty interest of natural
parents in the care, custody, and management of their child.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 747-48, 753 (1982) (requiring “clear and convincing evidence” to terminate
parental rights).
45. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (describing the historical recognition
by the courts that parents’ natural bonds of affection lead them to act in the best
interests of their children).
46. Robyn-Marie Lyon, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for
Minors, 75 CAL. L. REV. 681, 683 (1987) [hereinafter Lyon, Speaking for a Child].
47. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
48. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
49. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
50. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (exempting Amish children
from compulsory formal education beyond the eighth grade).
51. Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 n.13 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(quoting the 1983 report of the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medical and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, which found a
presumption that parents are the appropriate decision-makers for their infants).
52. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
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children’s best interests.53 Protection of parental rights in decision-making
furthers societal interests because parents are often simply the best
decision-makers for their children.54 Parents usually “know their children’s
needs, desires, strengths, weaknesses, personality, and history in nuanced
ways that others cannot come close to approaching.”55 They are in a
unique position both to advocate on behalf of their child and to serve as
experts on their child’s needs, especially where the child has a disability
and the parent understands the child’s needs most intimately. “Children are
extremely dependent on their parents for both care and support. This is
even more true for disabled students. In fact, parents of disabled children
literally are their lifelines . . . [t]hese parents undoubtedly are experts in the
everyday lives of children . . . .”56
In most cases, the parent or guardian will act in the best interests of the
child as expected by society and the courts.57 In seeking legal assistance in
a special education case, the caregiver is usually hoping to secure an
appropriate education for the child. Short of any limitations on the parent’s
legal right to make educational decisions or any indication that the parent is
unwilling or unable to serve as the client, a parent’s fundamental decisionmaking rights argue for a model of representation in which the parent is a
client.58
53. Christine Gottlieb, Children’s Attorneys’ Obligation to Turn to Parents to
Assess Best Interests, 6 NEV. L.J. 1263, 1264 (2006).
54. Jonathan Hafen, Children’s Rights and Legal Representation–The Proper Roles
of Children, Parents, and Attorneys, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 423,
427, 446 (1993).
55. Gottlieb, supra note 53, at 1264.
56. Justin M. Bathon, Defining “Parties Aggrieved” Under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act: Should Parents be Allowed to Represent their Disabled
Child Without an Attorney?, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 507, 507 (2005).
57. Neil H. Mickenberg, The Silent Clients: Legal and Ethical Considerations in
Representing Severely and Profoundly Retarded Individuals, 31 STAN. L. REV. 625,
628 (1979).
58. Lower courts have not always equated this strong protection of fundamental
parental rights with a strong protection of parental decision-making authority around
special education. For example, in appointing a guardian ad litem attorney to represent
a child in an IDEA case, despite the desire of the child’s mother to remain involved in
the litigation, one district court reasoned that such an action was not an infringement on
a parent’s fundamental constitutional right to make decisions regarding the education
of her child because the case did not implicate those rights, but rather statutory rights
under the IDEA. Muse B. v. Upper Darby Sch. Dist., No. 06-CV-00343, 2007 WL
2973709, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2007). By distinguishing between a parent’s
fundamental constitutional right to make educational decisions regarding her child and
the parent’s rights under the IDEA, the court emphasized that the appointment of the
guardian ad litem did not impede the former because the appointment was a narrowly
tailored remedy, as the guardian ad litem was limited to decision-making involving
educational matters related to a consent decree that had been previously negotiated
between the parent and the school district. Id. at *4-5. The court explained that the
parent still retained her rights to make decisions on such basic questions as how the
child should be raised and whether he should receive private, religious, or public
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If an attorney represents the parent exclusively and does not believe that
the parent is acting in the best interests of the child, the attorney might be
able to raise the issue with a hearing officer or judge and request a guardian
ad litem or separate counsel for the child.59 However, the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence establishing a parent’s right to make educational decisions
might lead a hearing officer or court to hesitate to appoint separate counsel
or a guardian ad litem for a child in a special education matter where the
parent retains educational decision-making rights. When there is a
designated guardian or guardian ad litem for a child, separate from the
attorney and from whom the attorney is taking direction, “the lawyer is not
required to meekly succumb to any course of action suggested by [that]
client representative.”60 However, in most cases, there will be no
designated guardian or guardian ad litem, and the parent will have
educational decision-making rights over the child. In such typical cases,
especially where the attorney represents the parent, that parent would be
accorded more deference by the attorney than would a guardian ad litem.
Unlike a designated guardian ad litem, parents have their own rights,
procedurally and substantively, to make decisions regarding their children’s
education more generally and special education in particular. If an attorney
lets her own views of the child’s needs and best interests govern the
decision-making or substitutes her own judgment for a parent’s, that
attorney is disenfranchising the parent and taking away rights squarely
recognized by the Supreme Court and Congress. Because parents have a
right to make decisions about their child’s education, barring any conflicts
of interest, special considerations related to delinquency or child welfare
system involvement, or unwillingness or inability on a parent’s part to
participate in the attorney-client relationship, a model of representation in
schooling, but did limit her right to special education decision-making by appointing
the guardian ad litem. Id. at *4. This opinion suggests that some courts might not find
a parent’s fundamental constitutional right to make decisions regarding her child’s
education as coextensive with a parent’s right to make decisions regarding her child’s
special education needs under the IDEA. However, this decision may have been
unique in that the court was concerned that the child was being left without
representation where the parent had fired several attorneys and was denied by the court
the ability to proceed pro se on behalf of her child because a non-attorney parent may
not proceed pro se on behalf of her minor child. Id. at *1, *3. Also, interestingly, the
court collapsed the attorney and the educational decision-maker into one individual: the
court-appointed guardian ad litem attorney. Id. at *3, *5. Other courts may instead
hesitate to tread on the parent’s constitutional right to make educational decisions,
finding that it does protect the parent’s right to make special education decisions as
well, or may be loathe to have an attorney play the role of both educational decisionmaker and counsel, as the guardian ad litem attorney did here.
59. Id. at *3.
60. Mickenberg, supra note 57, at 634; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 4 (2011) (“If the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from
the ward, and is aware that the guardian is acting adversely to the ward’s interest, the
lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or rectify the guardian’s misconduct.”).
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which the parent is not the sole client or at least one of the clients, and
particularly any model that gives the attorney power to decide what is in
the best interests of a child, deprives the parent of these significant rights.
2. The Parent’s Decision-Making Rights Under the IDEA
The IDEA’s grant of significant procedural and substantive rights to
parents is another important factor that attorneys should consider in
selecting a model of representation in a special education case. Parents
were the impetus behind the enactment of the statute and remain the
driving force for ensuring that children with disabilities receive the
educational services they require.61 The House and Senate committee
reports discuss the significant role of parents in decision-making, the
deference accorded to their views, and the overall importance of their
strong role.62 In many ways, parental involvement is essential for the
enforcement of the IDEA statutory scheme.63 The American Bar
Association advises attorneys and advocates to “make sure there is an
IDEA parent” in a special education case64 because “for the IDEA’s
substantive and procedural protection to work effectively, every child with
or who is thought to have a disability must have a ‘parent’ who can act on
her behalf.”65 “Under the IDEA, the parent has the legal authority to make
special education decisions for a child.”66
The IDEA specifically envisions the parent as the enforcer of special
education rights and confers upon the parent a wide variety of rights to
make certain that the child is being provided with a FAPE.67 The Supreme
Court noted that “parents and guardians will not lack ardor in seeking to
61. Jennifer Rosen Valverde, A New IDEA for Improving the Education of
Children with Disabilities in Foster Care: Applying Social Work Principles to the
Problem Definition Process, 26 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 17, 29 (2006) [hereinafter
Valverde, A New IDEA].
62. H.R. Rep. No. 104-614, at 4, 15 (1996); S. Rep. No. 105-17, at 2 (1997).
63. Margaret Wakelin, Challenging Disparities in Special Education: Moving
Parents from Disempowered Team Members to Ardent Advocates, 3 NW. J.L. & SOC.
POL’Y 263, 286 (2008) (citing Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist.,
550 U.S. 516 (2007)).
64. LEGAL CTR. FOR FOSTER CARE & EDUC., Special Education Decision Making:
Role of the Child’s Attorney, 27 A.B.A. CHILD LAW PRAC. 138 (2008), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/child/education/publications/sp
ecial_ed_series_DM_child_s_attorney.authcheckdam.pdf.
65. Janet Stotland et al., Special Education Decisions for Children in Foster Care:
Everyone Has a Role, 26 A.B.A. CHILD LAW PRAC. 21 (2007).
66. LEGAL CTR. FOR FOSTER CARE & EDUC., IDENTIFYING SPECIAL EDUCATION
DECISION MAKERS FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE: STATE LAW QUESTIONS 2 (2009),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/center_on_children_and_the
_law/education/state_law_questions_eddm.authcheckdam.pdf
67. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D) (2006).
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ensure that handicapped children receive all of the benefits to which they
are entitled by the Act.”68 The IEP is the plan that lays out the special
education services and accommodations that the child needs.69 Schools are
required to include the parent in meetings at which the IEP is developed.70
In devising the first federal special education statute, the Senate noted that
IEP meetings were a means for parents to frequently monitor the child’s
progress.71 Parents are viewed as “the logical agents of change” where
there is no forceful oversight by state or federal agencies.72 Parents are
assigned a substantial role in decision-making, provided through
“significant bargaining power” in the IEP process.73 The level of
participation by the child in an IEP meeting, on the other hand, is a
decision that belongs to the parent.74
Parental oversight is built into the IDEA as a “recognition of individual
parental insight and collective political influence.”75 Parents are experts in
knowing and raising their own children and contribute to the special
education process “as information gatherers and accumulators of
knowledge about their children through daily interactions with their child at
home, with the family, in the community.”76 Parents are not only accorded
the right to contribute to the IEP process by deciding what they believe to
be in the best interests of their child, they also provide information about
the child critical to developing a comprehensive IEP and about which only
they may be in a position to know.77 “A parent’s involvement in the entire
68.
69.
70.
71.

Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 178 (1982).
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV).
§ 1414(d)(1)(B).
See S. Rep. No. 94-168 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1435
(explaining that frequent monitoring is essential in structuring an adequate educational
program for the child and those involved in his care).
72. See Rosenbaum, supra note 12, at 162 (citing Guy Benveniste, Implementation
and Intervention Strategies: The Case of PL 94-142, in SCHOOL DAYS, RULE DAYS 153
(David L. Kirp & Donald N. Jensen eds., 1986)) (emphasizing the central role and
control of the parent in a child’s education).
73. See id. at 165 (citing Bruce Meredith & Julie Underwood, Irreconcilable
Differences? Defining the Rising Conflict Between Regular and Special Education, 24
J.L. & EDUC. 195, 200 (1995)).
74. See Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and
Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46540, 46671 (Aug. 14,
2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300 & 301) (“Generally, a child with a disability
should attend the IEP meeting if the parent decides that it is appropriate for the child to
do so.”); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(vii) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.321(b)
(2010); Tulman, Special Education Advocacy and Status Offense Charges, supra note
22, at 99.
75. See Rosenbaum, supra note 12, at 181 (noting that in spite of a parent’s central
role under the IDEA, a parent may not always know what is best for the child or who to
trust in the special education process).
76. Id. at 186 n.83.
77. Tandy & Heffernan, supra note 20, at 1400.
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process can significantly influence the type and level of educational
services that the student receives,”78 and Congress expressly acknowledged
that the educational services received by children with disabilities depend,
at least in part, on a parent’s ability to advocate on their behalf, up to and
including filing legal action to challenge the denial of educational
services.79 The IDEA reflects the practical recognition that parents are
vested with the authority and the obligation to oversee their child’s
education and to enforce their child’s rights under the Act.80
The “IDEA expressly contemplates that parents will act as advocates for
their children at every stage of the administrative process, from initial IEP
meetings to administrative due process hearings.”81 The statute provides
parents with many rights to guarantee they are included in every stage of
the IEP process and in seeking resolution of any disputes, including the
opportunities to request an initial evaluation; provide consent for
evaluations, special education, and related services; participate in decisionmaking about the child’s educational planning and placement; and examine
the child’s records.82 The IDEA also requires that parents be provided with
notice from school officials of the statute’s procedural safeguards; “prior
written notice whenever the responsible educational agency proposes (or
refuses) to change the child’s placement or program; an opportunity to
present complaints concerning any aspect of the local agency’s provision of
a free appropriate public education; and an opportunity for ‘an impartial
due process hearing’ with respect to any such complaints.”83
The IDEA explicitly vests in parents the right to bring an administrative
78. Deborah Rebore & Perry Zirkel, Transfer of Rights Under the Individuals with
Disabilities Act: Adulthood with Ability or Disability, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 33, 3334.
79. See Julie F. Mead & Mark A. Paige, Parents as Advocates: Examining the
History and Evolution of Parents’ Rights to Advocate for Children with Disabilities
under the IDEA, 34 J. LEGIS. 123, 125 (2008) (emphasizing the Senate’s finding that
when state and local districts were left on their own, they provide inadequate or no
educational services to children with disabilities).
80. Tandy & Heffernan, supra note 20, at 1399 (citing Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd.
of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 238-239 (3d Cir. 1998) (Roth, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (2006) (ensuring that parents and
children have procedural safeguards with respect to a free appropriate public
education); § 1415(b)(1) (providing parents the opportunity to examine all of their
child’s records); § 1415(b)(3) (requiring written notice to parents); § 1415(e)(2)(A)(ii)
(ensuring the mediation process does not deny or delay a parent’s right to a due process
hearing); § 1415(f)(1)(A) (giving parents the opportunity for an impartial due process
hearing); § 1415(k)(5)(B)(i) (basing a determination of school’s knowledge of a child’s
disability on what action a parent has taken to notify the school of concern); §
1415(m)(1)(B) (transferring all rights accorded to parents to the child once he or she
reaches the age of majority).
81. See Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Reg’l Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 247, 256 (1st Cir. 2003).
82. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(a)(1)(D)(i), 1415(b)(1)-(6).
83. § 1415(f); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1988).
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due process complaint to enforce their child’s special education rights.84 It
is not clear that hearing officers will allow a minor child to bring an
administrative due process complaint without involvement of a parent or
other adult in a parental role, as discussed below. Therefore, an attorney
might need to formally involve a parent in the legal representation as a
client at the time an administrative due process complaint must be filed.
Indeed, some lawyers who have used a model of representation in which
the child is exclusively the client acknowledge that the attorney might need
to bring the parent into the legal representation when a complaint must be
brought.85 Because it is likely that a parent or other adult must be the one
to bring and sign a due process complaint, especially in jurisdictions where
litigation is frequent and there is a higher likelihood that a due process
complaint would be filed in the course of the representation, many
attorneys include the parent in the representation as a client from the outset,
usually as the sole client.86
At the impartial due process hearing, parents are explicitly entitled to be
represented by counsel, present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and
pursue various remedies.87 The Supreme Court has explicitly emphasized
the central role of parents not only in the IEP process, but also in the
pursuit of relief for violations under the IDEA through a due process
hearing:
Congress repeatedly emphasized throughout the Act the importance and
indeed the necessity of parental participation in both the development of
the IEP and any subsequent assessments of its effectiveness.
Accordingly, the Act establishes various procedural safeguards that
guarantee parents both an opportunity for meaningful input into all
decisions affecting their child’s education and the right to seek review of
any decisions they think inappropriate.88
84. § 1415(b)(6).
85. Interview with Dean Rivkin, Distinguished Professor of Law, University of

Tennessee School of Law (Dec. 14, 2010) (discussing representation by Professor
Rivkin and his clinic students of children in truancy cases on special education matters
and their need to bring a parent into the representation should an administrative due
process complaint need to be filed).
86. The District of Columbia, where the author has practiced special education law,
is one of those jurisdictions in which litigation is frequently required. Many special
education attorneys in the District of Columbia include parents in the representation or
represent parents exclusively without formally including minor children as clients, and
bring due process complaints with the parent-clients as the named complainants. The
prominence of the model of representation in which the parent is the client is evidenced
by the name of a major national organization that works “to protect special education
rights and secure excellence in education for children with disabilities,” the Council of
Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Inc. The Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates,
Inc., (COPAA) (emphasis added), http://www.copaa.org/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2011);
see also Godsoe, All in the Family, supra note 20, at 14 n.66.
87. § 1413(a)(1)(B), (a)(1h)(D); § 1414(e); § 1415(b)(1), (3); § 1415(d)(1)(A).
88. Honig, 484 U.S. at 311-12.
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The IDEA also provides for the transfer of rights from parent to child
when the child reaches the age of majority, which may serve as evidence
that Congress intended certain rights to belong to the parent alone until that
time89 and can be used by attorneys to justify a model of representation in
which the parent is a client. Before the child reaches the age of majority,
the IDEA and applicable regulations appear to provide decision-making
rights—and in fact, all of the procedural rights provided for in the statute—
to the parent or person qualifying as a “parent” under the IDEA. Moreover,
that procedural rights under the IDEA belong to the parent is evidenced by
the IDEA’s provision for the appointment of a surrogate parent where no
other “parent” is identifiable,90 underscoring the need for an adult serving
in a parental decision-making role. While the IDEA plainly provides
parents with many concrete rights, the statute does not provide specific
rights to minor children, such as any procedural rights related to decisionmaking or the pursuit of administrative relief.91 The right that is clearly
accorded to children is the broader substantive right to a FAPE.92 Although
this right sits at the core of the IDEA and the child is literally the subject of
the entire statute, the parent is provided with the authority to protect and
enforce the child’s right to a FAPE.93 Barring any special circumstances,
such as court-ordered restrictions on the parent’s rights, or the inability or
unwillingness of the parent to participate in the attorney-client relationship,
the IDEA’s strong emphasis on the decision-making rights of parents
argues in favor of an attorney including the parent as a client in special
education matters.94
3. The Supreme Court’s Conclusion That Parents Have Substantive Rights
Under the IDEA
While the IDEA undoubtedly provides parents with procedural rights, as
described above, the Supreme Court has also affirmed the substantive
rights of parents in the special education context, emphasizing that “it is not
a novel proposition to say that parents have a recognized legal interest in
the education and upbringing of their child.”95 In Winkelman ex rel.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

§ 1415(m).
§ 1415(b)(2).
Id.
§ 1400(d)(1)(A).
See Patricia A. Massey & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Disability Matters: Toward
a Law School Clinical Model for Serving Youth with Special Education Needs, 11
CLINICAL L. REV. 271, 277 (2005) (“Congress intended each parent to contribute to the
educational planning as an expert on her child and to advocate for the child’s needs . . .
In the end, although IDEA includes the above-described institutional enforcement
mechanisms, the primary role of enforcement falls as a practical matter on parents.”).
94. § 1414(a)(1)(D).
95. Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 529
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Winkelman v. Parma City School District,96 the Supreme Court held that
the IDEA provides parents with not only procedural rights and the right to
sue, but independent, enforceable, substantive rights, which they are
empowered by the IDEA to enforce as “real parties in interest.”97
Attorneys should consider the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Winkleman, and its reasoning therein, in deciding which model of
representation to use in a special education case.
Prior to the Court’s decision, the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals
diverged regarding the ability of non-attorney parents to appear pro se on
behalf of their child in a civil action under the IDEA.98 In 2003, Mr. and
(2007).
96. Id. at 516.
97. Id. at 531.
98. Looking to FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c) (discussing who can represent a minor in
federal court), 28 U.S.C. § 1654, and the common law rule that a non-lawyer may not
represent another person in court, some Circuit Courts of Appeals held prior to
Winkelman that parents could not proceed pro se in IDEA cases in federal court
because it is not in the interest of the child to be represented by non-attorney parents
where the claims required adjudication, given that the child is entitled to trained legal
assistance so that her rights may be fully protected. See Myers v. Loudoun Pub. Sch.,
418 F.3d 395, 401 (4th Cir. 2005) (“We therefore join the vast majority of our sister
circuits in holding that non-attorney parents generally may not litigate the claims of
their minor children in federal court”); Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 970 (6th
Cir. 2002) (“[P]arents cannot appear pro se on behalf of their minor children because a
minor’s personal cause of action is her own and does not belong to her parent or
representative.”); Devine v. Indian River Cnty. Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 582 (11th Cir.
1997) (“[P]arents who are not attorneys may not bring a pro se action on their child’s
behalf-because it helps to ensure that children rightfully entitled to legal relief are not
deprived of their day in court by unskilled, if caring, parents.”); Johns v. Cnty. of San
Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e hold that a parent or guardian cannot
bring an action on behalf of a minor child without retaining a lawyer.”); Hickey v.
Wellesley Sch. Cmty., 14 F.3d 44, n.1 (1st Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision);
Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Penn., 937 F.2d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991); Cheung v.
Youth Orchestra Found., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[A] non-attorney parent
must be represented by counsel in bringing an action on behalf of his or her child.”);
Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Prior to
Winkelman, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that parents
could proceed pro se in IDEA cases because they were “parties aggrieved” within the
meaning of the IDEA, as the statute provides them with the right to request a due
process hearing at the administrative level that must be exhausted prior to a civil action.
Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Reg’l Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 247, 250-52 (1st Cir. 2003). The
United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits
held before Winkelman that parents were permitted to appear pro se on their own
behalf, but not permitted to assert the claims of their children. Mosely v. Bd. of Educ.,
434 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that parents cannot proceed pro se on behalf of
their child in an IDEA case but are entitled to bring their own action on their own
behalf for their procedural rights violations); Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 146
F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that a parent who is not an attorney could not appear
pro se on behalf of a child but that the parent can represent herself on claims related to
the parental role under IDEA); Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225 (3d
Cir. 1998) (concluding that non-attorney parents were not entitled to represent their
child under the IDEA in federal proceedings because Congress did not intend to
override the common law principle that a non-lawyer may not represent another person
in court, and the IDEA does not create joint rights in parent and child. Because parents
do not have rights without a disabled child, the rights are divisible and not concurrent);
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Mrs. Winkelman became involved in lengthy legal proceedings in which
they wanted to proceed pro se, alleging that the Parma City School District
had failed to provide their son, Jacob, who has an autism spectrum
disorder, with a FAPE.99 In deciding whether parents, either on their own
behalf or as representatives of their children, could proceed in court
unrepresented by counsel under the IDEA, Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, determined that parents enjoy independent and enforceable
substantive rights under the IDEA as “parties aggrieved” and are entitled to
prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf.100 Furthermore, the Court
rejected the school district’s argument that parental involvement is only
required so that parents can represent their children and that the IDEA
accords parents nothing more than procedural tools relating to their
children’s substantive rights.101 Because the purpose of the IDEA is to
protect the rights of children with disabilities and their parents, it would be
Devine, 121 F.3d at 582 (holding that a non-lawyer parent does not have right to act as
counsel in an action brought pursuant to the IDEA on the child’s behalf in federal
court, even though he or she can do so in due process hearings). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also determined that parents could not appear pro
se on behalf of their children, reasoning that even though parents are entitled to
represent their child in administrative proceedings, the IDEA does not similarly carve
out an exception to permit parents to represent their children in federal proceedings.
Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local Sch. Dist., 409 F.3d 753, 756-57 (6th Cir. 2005). The
Sixth Circuit went one step further than the Second, Third, Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits by explicitly stating that parents have procedural rights but not substantive
rights because the child’s right to receive a free appropriate public education belonged
to the child alone. Cavanaugh, 409 F.3d at 757.
99. Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 520. The Winkelmans appealed the hearing officer’s
rejection of their claims to the state-level review officer and, after losing that appeal,
filed both on their own behalf and on behalf of Jacob in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio. The District Court found that the school district had
provided Jacob with a FAPE. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 411 F. Supp. 2d
722 (N.D. Ohio 2005). The Winkelman’s appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, which ordered dismissal of their appeal before reaching the merits,
concluding that non-attorney parents could not represent their disabled child in IDEA
suit. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 150 F. App’x. 406, 407 (6th Cir. 2005).
The Winkelmans by this time were again representing themselves pro se and raised on
appeal whether parents may pursue an appeal to the Federal District Court of an
administrative decision under the IDEA pro se, on behalf of themselves and on behalf
of their minor children. See Pro Se Appellant’s Brief, Winkelman v. Parma City Sch.
Dist., 150 F. App’x. 406, 407 (6th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-4159), 2004 WL 5489342. The
Winkelman’s then sought review from the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in
light of the disagreement between the circuits over the ability of non-attorney parents to
appear pro se under the IDEA. Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 522.
100. See Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 522-24, 535 (examining the procedures within the
IDEA that are followed when a child’s IEP is established). The majority discussed the
criteria governing the sufficiency of an education provided to a child, the requirement
that the child’s IEP meet the unique needs of the child, the mechanisms for review that
must be made available to a party when there are objections to the IEP, and the
requirement that in certain circumstances, the state must reimburse the parents for
various expenses, such as private school tuition and attorneys’ fees under the IDEA.
See id.
101. Id. at 527-28.
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illogical to conclude that the word “rights” refers just to the child and not to
both the child and the parent.102 The Court determined that the IDEA
created in parents an independent stake not only in the procedures, but also
in substantive decisions concerning the provision of a free appropriate
public education to their children. The Court considered that parents are
entitled to participate in not only the implementation of the statute’s
procedures, but also in the substantive formation of their child’s IEP and
emphasized that parents are empowered to bring challenges under the
IDEA on a wide range of issues.103 Because parents enjoy enforceable
rights at the administrative stage, the Court reasoned that it would be
inconsistent with the statutory scheme to bar them from continuing to assert
those rights in federal court.104 The majority held that parents’ rights are
not limited to certain procedural and reimbursement related matters, but are
also encompassed in the entitlement to a FAPE for their child.105
Therefore, the Court concluded that the Sixth Circuit erred when it
dismissed the Winkelmans’ appeal for lack of counsel because parents are
entitled to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf as “parties
aggrieved.”106 With this holding, the Supreme Court explicitly declined to
decide the related question of whether the IDEA entitles parents to litigate
their child’s claims pro se.107
As a result of the holding in Winkelman, non-attorney parents not only
began bringing their own claims pro se, as allowed by the Court, but also
the claims of their children, even though the Court specifically declined to
decide if non-attorney parents are able to litigate their child’s claims pro se
under the IDEA.108 Therefore, the lower courts continue to be faced with
the question of whether non-attorney parents can represent their child in
federal court pro se.109 Some non-attorney parents have argued that
Winkleman provided them with the ability to represent the claims of their
child in court.110 The lower courts that have examined this issue since
Winkelman have concluded that the IDEA only allows parents to bring their

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 528.
Id. at 530-31.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 535.
Id.
Id.
See Patricia C. Hagdorn, Comment, Winkelman v. Parma City School District:
A Major Victory for Parents or More Ambiguity?, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 981, 998
(2009) (discussing the ambiguity resulting from the decision).
110. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Hamilton Twp. Pub. Schs., No. 06-3815, 2007 WL
4556968, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2007); Chase v. Mesa Cnty. Valley Sch. Dist., No. 07cv-00205, 2007 WL 2889446, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept. 27, 2007).
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own claims and not the claims of their children pro se.111 As a result, nonattorney parents can currently proceed pro se on their own behalf in federal
court, but not on behalf of their children under the IDEA because even if
the parents are “parties aggrieved” and have both substantive and
procedural rights, they still cannot represent as a non-attorney the claims of
another.112
However, the Supreme Court’s recognition that parents on their own are
“parties aggrieved” with substantive rights under the IDEA supports an
111. See Hunter v. Ind. Sch. Dist., No. 09-1664, 2010 WL 1333232, at *5 (W.D. Pa.
Mar. 31, 2010); L.F. v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., No. H-08-2415, 2009 WL 3073926,
at *19 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2009); M.W. v. Clarke Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 3:06-CV-49,
2008 WL 4449591, at *8-9 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2008); N.N.J. v. Broward Cnty. Sch.
Bd., No. 06-61282, 2007 WL 3120299, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 2007); Woodruff, 2007
WL 4556968 (acknowledging that these courts have all concluded that Winkelman did
not abrogate the previous holdings among the circuits that Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c) and 28
U.S.C. § 1654 prohibited non-attorney parents from representing their child pro se); see
also Lenker v. Gray, No. 2:07-CV-274, 2008 WL 4613534, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 10,
2008); J.R. v. Sylvan Union Sch. Dist., No. 06-2136, 2008 WL 682595 (E.D. Cal. Mar.
10, 2008); N.N.J., 2007 WL 3120299; L.J. v. Broward Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 06-61282,
2007 WL 1695333 (S.D. Fla. June 8, 2007); Bell v. Anderson Cnty. Sch., No. 1:07-cv00936, 2007 WL 2265067 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 6, 2007) (addressing that some courts have
simply dismissed the claims brought on behalf of the child without prejudice); cf.
Chambers v. Tibbs, 980 So. 2d 1010 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (holding that parents could
not represent the claims of their child so that part of their appeal was dismissed); B.D.
ex rel. Dragomir v. Griggs, No. 1:09cv439, 2010 WL 2775841 (W.D.N.C. July 13,
2010); Chase, 2007 WL 2889446, at *1 (addressing that other courts have dismissed
the complaint because the parents lacked standing to represent their child’s claims).
See generally L.F., 2009 WL 3073926, at *11; French v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Educ.,
No. 5:04-CV-434, 2008 WL 4426625 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2008); Woodruff, 2007 WL
4556968, at *5 (some courts have allowed the parents to leave and amend their
complaint so that the complaint reflects the parents’ claims and not the child’s claims).
Another district court judge simply substituted the parents’ names for the child’s name
in the complaint since they both had identical claims. See Alexandra R. v. Brookline
Sch. Dist., No. 06-cv-215, 2007 WL 2669717 (D.N.H. Sept. 6, 2007). Three district
courts stated that parents were actually asserting their own claims even though the
complaint referred to the child’s claims. See B.J.S. v. State Educ. Dep’t, No. 08-CV513A, 2010 WL 502796 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2010); D.E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist.,
No. 1:06-CV-2423, 2009 WL 904960 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2009); M.W., 2008 WL
4449591. Some judges, including a panel of circuit court judges, informed parents that
they needed to obtain counsel in order to represent their child’s claim. See KLA v.
Windham Se. Supervisory Union, 348 Fed. App’x. 604 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that
appeal would proceed if parents obtained counsel but if they did not then the appeal
would be dismissed); B.D.S. v. Southold Union Free Sch. Dist, Nos. CV-08-1319, CV08-1864, 2009 WL 1875942 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2009); French, 2008 WL 4426625;
Woodruff, 2007 WL 4556968. One magistrate judge stated that the parent could not
present the claims of the child and therefore appointed a guardian ad litem to represent
the child. St. Joseph-Ogden Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 305 v. Janet W., No. 07-CV2079, 2008 WL 170693 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2008). Another panel of circuit court judges
found that though the parents filed the complaint on their own behalf as well as on
behalf of their child, the complaint asserts independent claims so they can proceed pro
se. A.P. v. Woodstock Bd. of Educ., 370 Fed. App’x. 202 (2d Cir. 2010).
112. A.P., 370 Fed. App’x. at 202. Non-attorney parents proceeding pro se need to
ensure that their complaint words their claims as their own claims and not the claims of
the child to avoid any delay or prejudice in having their complaint dismissed, being
required to leave and amend the complaint, or being required to obtain counsel for their
child’s claims.
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attorney’s decision to include a parent as a client in an IDEA case.
Conversely, the decisions of lower courts following Winkelman that nonattorney parents may not represent the rights of their children in federal
court lends support to the notion that children have their own distinct rights
under the IDEA, which could be litigated separately from a parent’s claims
by an attorney.113 Moreover, the Supreme Court may have created further
confusion by asserting that “Congress specifically indicated that parents
have rights under the Act that are separate from and independent of their
children’s rights,” but acknowledging that “it is difficult to disentangle the
provisions in order to conclude that some rights adhere to both parent and
child while others do not.”114 Although parents have distinct substantive
rights under the IDEA pursuant to Winkelman, the rights of parents and
their children are intertwined, as “parents have no rights under the IDEA if
they do not have a disabled child seeking an education.”115 While the
decision in Winkelman affirms the substantive rights of parents under the
IDEA and favors including the parent as a client in a special education
matter, the decision also suggests that minor children have separate and
distinct rights under the IDEA worthy of a voice—and therefore worthy of
inclusion in the attorney-client relationship.116
B. Who is the “Parent?”
In deciding the model of representation to use in an IDEA case, an
attorney should consider which individual or individuals could serve as a
“parent” under the IDEA. A variety of individuals, including but not
limited to a biological parent, might play the role of “parent” under special
education law.117 Whenever a “parent” is referenced in this Article, that
person could be any individual who meets the IDEA definition of a
“parent” and can therefore serve as the educational decision-maker in

113. Godsoe, All in the Family, supra note 20, at 11-12, 19-20 (“A more general
recognition of the potential for conflict between parents and children is the common
law rule that a parent may not represent her child pro se . . . [this rule] appears to
contradict the general presumption that parents are the best voice for their children and
that they can consequently direct litigation on behalf of the child.”). Because parents
and their children may have distinct rights under the IDEA, it is possible that they
could have separate attorneys in a special education matter. However, due to the
scarcity of attorneys who handle special education matters, the likely reluctance of
many attorneys to provide representation when another attorney is already involved in
the matter, and the concern that a hearing officer or court may not allow parents and
their child to bring separate claims with separate representation, it may be impossible
for both parents and child to obtain separate representation.
114. Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 532,
541 (2007).
115. Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 1998).
116. Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 529.
117. 34 C.F.R. § 300.30 (2011).
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regards to special education.118 The IDEA defines a parent as a natural,
adoptive, or foster parent (unless a foster parent is prohibited by state law
from serving in that role); a guardian (although not the state if a child is a
ward of the state); an individual acting in the place of a natural or adoptive
parent, including a grandparent, stepparent, or other relative, with whom
the child lives; an individual who is legally responsible for the child’s
welfare; or an individual assigned to be a surrogate parent under the
IDEA.119 The biological or adoptive parent is presumed to be the “parent”
for purposes of the IDEA. However, that person may be replaced in this
role if he or she does not have legal authority to make educational decisions
for the child or a judicial decree or order identifies another person, who
otherwise qualifies under the IDEA as a “parent,” to act in that role.120
Because the IDEA defines “parent” broadly to include a variety of different
adults, many individuals might qualify as a “parent” and serve as the client
in a special education matter.
The IDEA also provides for the appointment of a surrogate parent
whenever the parents of a child are not known, the local or state agency
cannot, after reasonable efforts, locate the parents, or the child is a ward of
the state.121 The surrogate may not have any personal or professional
interest conflicting with the interest of the child, must have the knowledge
and skills to ensure adequate representation of the child, and cannot be an
employee of any agency involved in the education or care of the child,
although the surrogate can be paid by the state to serve in that role.122 If the
child is a ward of the State, the surrogate can be appointed by the judge
overseeing the child’s care, as long as that surrogate meets the
requirements of the IDEA.123 The local educational agency must appoint a
surrogate for an unaccompanied homeless youth. Where necessary, staff of
emergency shelters, independent living programs, and street outreach
programs can be appointed as temporary surrogate parents, even though
they may be employed by an agency involved in the care of the child, until
a surrogate parent can be appointed who meets all of the statutory
requirements.124 “The State is responsible for ensuring that a surrogate is
appointed within thirty days after a determination by a state or local

118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(23) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.30(a).
34 C.F.R. § 300.30(b).
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2)(A). The state or local educational agency must have an
established method for determining whether a child needs a surrogate parent and for
assigning the surrogate. 34 C.F.R. § 300.519(b).
122. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.519(d)-(e).
123. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2)(A)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.519(c).
124. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2)(A)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.519(f).
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educational agency that the child needs a surrogate.125 Surrogate parents
can represent the child in all matters relating to the identification,
evaluation, and educational placement of the child and in all matters
relating to the provision of a free appropriate public education to the
student.”126
Congress’ explicit provision for the appointment of a surrogate parent
when necessary further supports the significance Congress placed on the
parental role in educational decision-making and provides further
justification for a model of representation in which an adult serves as the
decision-maker and client in a special education case.127 On the other hand,
especially where the “parent” is a surrogate who does not intimately know
the child—or possibly does not know the child at all—the attorney should
involve the child in the representation in some way, whether formally as a
client or in more informal ways, so that the child’s needs and interests are
brought to light.
Involvement by more than one parent can present another complication
in determining who will serve in the role of educational decision-maker and
direct the legal representation. Sometimes two parents will want to be
involved in making special education decisions. In other situations, a child
may move between the homes of two parents or from the care of a parent to
the care of another relative and back to the parent. In such a situation, two
or more different individuals may be interested in serving as the
educational decision-maker. To minimize the complications and potential
conflicts of joint representation of two adults in the client role, some
attorneys request that parents or caregivers select only one person to serve
in the client role, whose decisions would control the course of the legal
case. If the attorney chooses to represent multiple parents or caregivers in
a special education matter, the attorney should consider potential or
existing conflicts of interest among the joint clients, as discussed below,
and clarify and plan with the joint clients what will happen if a conflict
125. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2)(B).
126. Yael Zakai Cannon & Laura Rinaldi, Initiating a Special Education Case, in

SPECIAL EDUC. ADVOCACY 10 (Ruth Colker & Julie K. Waterstone eds., 2011) (citing
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2)(B)); 34 C.F.R. § 300.519(h); 34 C.F.R. § 300.519(g)). Also,
the authors note that:
“[S]ome states have separate provisions allowing for the appointment of a
foster parent as the educational decision-maker. For example, New Hampshire
provides that where the parental rights of the biological parents have been
terminated by a court of law or by death, a foster parent in a long-term parental
relationship with a child can be appointed, and such appointment would
supersede that of a surrogate parent. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186-c:14-a
(2010).”
See id.
127. 34 C.F.R. § 300.519.
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arises between them.
C. Legal Capacity of a Minor to Independently Bring a Due Process
Hearing Complaint or Civil Action in Federal Court128
Where filing an administrative due process complaint is necessary, it is
unclear whether a minor student may independently bring the complaint
under the IDEA without any involvement from a parent or other guardian
or next friend. The IDEA and applicable regulations explicitly entitle
parents to file a due process complaint when they are aggrieved.129 The
regulations also reference the parent as the individual who should be
provided with information about free and low cost legal services upon
filing a complaint, perhaps alluding to the role that belongs to the parent,
and not the student, as complainant in a due process hearing, and the
parent’s entitlement to be accompanied by legal representation.130
However, hearing officers in some jurisdictions have recognized the legal
capacity of minors to independently bring special education due process
complaints, and have allowed children to sign and bring a complaint
without involvement of a parent or caregiver.131 Attorneys should
investigate the policies and practices of hearing officers in their jurisdiction
prior to filing a due process complaint on behalf of a minor without
involvement of a parent or other guardian or next friend. These policies
and practices might influence the model of representation used by the
attorney. Absent a policy or practice recognizing the capacity of minor
children to bring due process complaints, an attorney who wishes to assist a
128. The legal “capacity” to sue or bring a complaint, as discussed here and
throughout, references a hearing officer’s or court’s acceptance of the naming of a
minor child, without the naming of an adult on the child’s behalf or as next friend, as
the complainant in a suit. The decision by a hearing officer or court as to whether a
minor child may or may not independently bring a due process complaint or civil action
on her own is sometimes referred to among attorneys as the child’s “independent
standing” or “standing.” However, the concept of “standing” usually refers to
constitutional and prudential questions regarding whether an individual has suffered a
cognizable injury-in-fact such that the individual will have the requisite interest in the
case to litigate it fully. For children, the issue as discussed here is not whether they
have suffered this kind of Article III harm, as a child denied FAPE could certainly
show that harm, but rather whether they are deemed by a court or hearing officer to
have sufficient capacity and judgment to participate in the lawsuit as a party, guide
their attorneys, and serve as named complainants in a suit without adult involvement as
a next friend or otherwise on their behalf. Therefore, this Article discusses the legal
“capacity” to sue or bring a complaint, rather than referencing this issue as one of
“standing.”
129. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(8); 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a)(1).
130. 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a)(1)-(b).
131. Interview with Marlies Spanjaard, Ed Law Project, Children’s Law Center,
Massachusetts (Mar. 10, 2011) [hereinafter Interview with Spanjaard]. Marlies
Spanjaard is the Project Coordinator for The Edlaw Project, an initiative of the
Children’s Law Center of Massachusetts and the Youth Advocacy Department, which
advocates for the education rights of indigent children in Massachusetts. Id.
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minor in filing a complaint should prepare arguments to justify the child’s
capacity to sue in the event that it is challenged by opposing counsel or a
hearing officer.
Not specific to the special education context, many jurisdictions have
procedural codes, court rules, or administrative rules delineating that a
minor does not have the capacity to sue on her own behalf and that a minor
may only sue or be sued through a “representative, such as a general
guardian” or “by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem” in local or state
court or in administrative hearings.132 Depending on the specifics of state
law, a parent or adult “representative” may be needed to sue on the child’s
behalf in state court or administrative hearings in that state.133
If the case necessitates a civil action in federal court, an adult
representative is necessary for the child to bring suit, a principle also
enshrined in common law. Courts have recognized that minors are limited
in their capacity to exercise reasoned judgment in making significant
decisions; the judicial system assumes that parents or other adults are better
situated to make such decisions.134 For example, the Supreme Court has
emphasized that:
States validly may limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves
in the making of important, affirmative choices with potentially serious
consequences. These rulings have been grounded in the recognition that,
during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often
lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid
choices that could be detrimental to them . . . . The State commonly
protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own
immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important
decisions by minors . . . Legal restrictions on minors, especially those
supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child’s chances
for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free
society meaningful and rewarding.135

Unless a court declares a parent unfit, she will usually have the
responsibility to make decisions on the child’s behalf in the course of
litigation and can choose whether to consult with the child about these
decisions.136
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have codified this principle, and do

132. See Moore, supra note 1, at 1828-29 (noting that the legal inability to sue
minors is based upon common law).
133. Id. at 1828-29.
134. Tandy & Heffernen, supra note 20, at 1398 (citing Hafen, supra note 42, at
438-39).
135. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634-639 (1979) (plurality opinion).
136. Tandy & Heffernen, supra note 20, at 1399.
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not allow a minor child to bring a civil action without a representative.137
The Rules provide that a minor or an incompetent person who does not
have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next friend or by a
guardian ad litem.138 A minor may not sue on her own; if she is
unrepresented in an action, the court must appoint a guardian ad litem or
issue another appropriate order to appoint an adult “representative.”139
Consequently, when a child’s substantive rights need to be enforced in a
civil action in federal court, parents are often involved to serve as an adult
“representative.” The need for an adult “representative” to bring a claim on
behalf of a minor in federal court calls into question whether an attorney
could exclusively represent a child in a federal civil action alleging
violations of the IDEA, without involvement of a parent or other adult in
the representation. If an attorney represents a child as the exclusive client
and federal litigation becomes necessary, the attorney must elicit the
participation of a parent or other adult “representative” in the litigation or
seek to have a guardian or guardian ad litem appointed. As a result, in
federal civil actions under the IDEA, it is quite possible that an attorney
bringing an IDEA case, at least at that stage, must formally include a parent
or identify another adult to include in the legal representation as a client.
It may also be possible for an attorney to serve in the guardian ad litem
role, thereby eliminating the necessity of involvement by another adult in
the litigation.140 However, such an arrangement provides a great deal of
power to the attorney, in that the court would be sanctioning a model in
which that individual plays both attorney and client and can determine what
courses of action are in the best interests of the child and then litigate the
case based on those beliefs. An attorney serving as next friend or guardian
ad litem should aim to maintain fidelity to an expressed interests model of
representation on behalf of the child or at least to incorporate the child’s
views into the litigation to the greatest extent possible so as not to
maximize the attorney’s voice at the expense of the child’s.
Without clear delineation and discussion of the roles of each individual,
federal litigation can create confusion for attorneys, parents, and children in
special education matters. In other civil contexts, where parents bring
cases on behalf of their children in this way, it is not necessarily clear who
has the authority to make decisions during the course of the litigation.
Sometimes general guardians are considered real parties in interest,
137. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c)(1) (noting that a general guardian, a committee, a
conservator, or a fiduciary may sue or defend on behalf of a minor).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Muse B. v. Upper Darby Sch. Dist., No. 06-CV-00343, 2007 WL
2973709 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2007) (appointing a guardian ad litem to represent the
child).
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whereas next friends and guardians ad litem are sometimes treated as
nominal parties, with the minor being the real party in interest.141 If the
latter situation applies, it may be possible for an attorney to represent the
child exclusively if the child is the only real party in interest in a case.
However, because parents are considered real parties in interest in a special
education matter, pursuant to Winkelman, the parent may conversely be
treated as a real party and not as a nominal party when filing as next friend
of a child.142 The attorney may choose to have the parent and child both
serve as fully named plaintiffs, or real parties in interest, with both family
members directing the litigation. Alternatively, the attorney could file the
complaint with the parent named as the next friend, acting on behalf of the
child, and with the parent setting the representation goals and guiding
counsel, even though the child is the real party in interest.143 Either of
these models contemplates the parent taking an active role in directing the
attorney through the course of the federal litigation.
However, the parent or caregiver could agree to serve as a next friend on
paper only, taking a more back seat role and acting primarily in the role of
next friend as a formality to allow the minor to sue, while the child sets the
goals and directs the attorney. If the adult simply plays the role of
“representative” in name only in this way, such an arrangement might lead
to confusion in the attorney-client relationship because the adult
“representative” would still have some authority in the court’s eyes to make
decisions by virtue of her role in the litigation and might not be easily
relegated to a non-client role in which she only represents the child’s
interests on paper.
A federal court adjudicating a special education complaint with no
named adult representative might require the attorney to withdraw the
complaint to add the parent or another adult representative as next friend or
might appoint an adult representative to serve in a guardian ad litem role.
When a next friend is not named, the court must appoint a guardian ad
litem—or issue another appropriate order—to protect the minor who is
unrepresented in an action.144 If the attorney specifically wanted to exclude
the parent from representation (for example, where a conflict existed
between the parent and child), the attorney could identify another adult
whose interests do not diverge with the child’s to serve as the guardian ad
litem, at least on paper for purposes of the suit, whether or not that person
141. Moore, supra note 1, at 1829.
142. Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 530-31

(2007).
143. Stanley S. Herr, Representation of Clients with Disabilities: Issues of Ethics
and Control, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 609, 624 (1990).
144. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c) (2011).
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participates more directly in the attorney-client relationship. Upon learning
of such an arrangement, a federal court might question the failure to
include the parent in the litigation, but the attorney might be able to explain
the divergence of interests and successfully bring the case with another
adult serving as guardian ad litem or next friend.
As described above, it is unclear whether a minor child could bring a due
process complaint under the IDEA. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
clearly prohibit minors from bringing their own civil actions in federal
court, without adult “representatives.”145 Therefore, to allow the attorney
to pursue a due process complaint or civil action if necessary, the
involvement of an adult in the representation in some way—whether as a
client or in a more limited role as “next friend” for purposes of the
complaint—will often be necessary.
D. Expectations of the Attorney-Client Relationship By the Student,
Parents and Other Individuals
When a parent retains a lawyer regarding a matter in which a child’s
interests are involved, the parent will often select the lawyer, pay for the
lawyer’s services, and fully expect to direct the representation.146 A model
of representation in which the parent retains the attorney, but the attorney
represents the child exclusively, might create confusion for all parties if the
parent expects to be the decision-maker in the attorney-client
relationship.147 Unless the lawyer clearly states that she is not representing
the parent, but rather only the child, “the parent’s reasonable expectations
and reliance may form the basis of an attorney-client relationship, despite
the intent of the lawyer.”148 A child may also assume that a lawyer stands
united with her parent or even her school when the lawyer in fact represents
her wishes. Alternatively, a child may assume that the lawyer is there to
act on her expressed position when that is not the case and information she
shares with the lawyer will be kept secret when it will not, or that the
lawyer is obligated to act upon his request when she is not.149
Through the language in a retainer or through conversation with the
family, attorneys might similarly create expectations that differ from the
actual model the attorney intends to use. For example, “a lawyer may end
145. Id. (detailing who may sue or defend on behalf of a minor).
146. Moore, supra note 1, at 1824; see also Petrera, supra note 2, at 554.
147. Interesting ethical questions arise when a parent hires an attorney to represent a

child. For a discussion of the related ethical questions in the delinquency context, see
Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism, and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and the
Role of Child’s Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 300
(2005).
148. Tandy & Heffernan, supra note 20, at 1402.
149. Buss, supra note 21, at 1700.
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up representing both a parent and child without she or the parties explicitly
engaging in joint representation . . . many attorneys who represent parents
believe that they are also implicitly attorneys for the child.”150 Other
special education attorneys may create expectations that they represent the
child in special education matters because they describe themselves as
child advocates when they are in fact retained by parents, while other
attorneys purporting to represent the child may in fact see themselves as
advocates for the parents or the entire family.151 Due to the confusion
created by some attorneys in their self-characterization or through
ambiguous or conflicting language in a retainer or in discussions with the
client, either the parent, the child, or both individuals may be mistaken as
to whom the attorney in fact represents.
Other individuals involved in addressing the child’s special education
needs, such as school staff, an administrative due process hearing officer,
or a judge may be expecting the attorney to take direction from the parent,
not the child, for many of the same reasons. Moreover, school staff may be
accustomed to parents serving in the client role when an attorney is
involved and administrative hearing officers and judges may be expecting
the attorney to represent the parent due to the limitations on a minor’s legal
capacity to bring suit, as discussed above. If many parties expect the
lawyer to represent the parent, a model of representation that excludes the
parent may result in confusion and complications for the attorney.
Conversely, some parents may not expect to be intimately involved with
the legal representation or with the special education process more
generally, or may not feel empowered or able to participate actively. The
level and quality of parental involvement can vary depending on the wealth
and formal education of the parent and the child’s degree of disability.152
Parents who are marginalized by poverty or race, or “have other family
stress or have limited English proficiency, continue to be disenfranchised in
the special education process.”153 However, low expectations on the part of
parents as to their role in the attorney-client relationship can often be
overcome with effective engagement and counseling of a parent client.
Although mistaken beliefs and confusion about who is serving in the client
role can and should be minimized by the attorney, the expectations of the
parent, the student, school officials, hearing officers, and judges should be
considered by an attorney in deciding which model of representation to use
150.
151.
152.
153.

Godsoe, All in the Family, supra note 20, at 17.
See id.
Rosenbaum, supra note 12, at 185 n.82.
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPROVING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT: MAKING SCHOOLS WORK FOR ALL
OF AMERICA’S CHILDREN 122 (1995).
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in a particular special education case and how and to whom to provide
clarification about who will be serving in the client role.
E. The Child’s Characteristics and Capacity to Participate in the
Attorney-Client Relationship
In deciding whether it is possible to establish an attorney-client
relationship with a student in a special education matter, the attorney
should consider the student’s age, maturity level, and capacity to consent to
representation and make decisions throughout the course of the case. A
child with a disability is not necessarily unable to participate in the
attorney-client relationship simply by virtue of her disability or age, even if
she has been declared incompetent or would be considered incompetent
under certain legal standards.154 Even clients who might be considered or
declared legally incompetent on the basis of disability can be capable of
articulating their own concerns, understanding a legal problem, and
assisting counsel in contributing to its solution.155
While the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (“Model Rules”) conflate minority of age and disability in one
rule concerning representation of individuals with diminished capacity, the
American Bar Association Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who
Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases include some more
nuanced, useful principles for special education attorneys to consider in
regards to capacity and age, even outside of the abuse and neglect
context.156 These Standards of Practice do not assume that minority in and
of itself is a disability, and instead reflect the heterogeneity of children.157
154. Because the concept of incompetency is elusive and blurry, and the “disabled”
population is heterogeneous, lawyers should not assume that all individuals with
disabilities or with any particular disability have the same needs or that any individual
is unable to carry out a typical lawyer-client relationship by virtue of her disability.
Herr, supra note 143, at 618. Moreover, the term “incompetent,” although used in the
IDEA, no longer reflects the current understanding that capacity is contextual and is not
an all or nothing proposition, as assumed by the notions of “competency” and
“incompetency.” Robert D. Dinerstein, Guardianship and Its Alternatives, in ADULTS
WITH DOWN SYNDROME 253, 237 (Siegfried M. Pueschel ed., 2006). Moreover, current
understanding of capacity recognizes that capacity can be enhanced for many people
with appropriate supports to assist them in decision-making. ELLMANN ET AL., supra
note 36, at 110.
155. Mickenberg, supra note 57, at 626.
156. AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT
CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES
(1996),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/child/repstandwhole/pdf.
157. Id. at cmt. B-3. The commentary to the ABA Standards of Practice for
Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases advocates for an
individualized assessment of each child’s competence to determine her position with
respect to different issues: “These Standards do not accept the idea that children of
certain ages are ‘impaired,’ ‘disabled,’ ‘incompetent,’ or lack capacity to determine
their position in litigation. Further, these Standards reject the concept that any
disability must be globally determined. Rather, disability is contextual, incremental,
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Although children may have certain cognitive and psychosocial limitations
that can frustrate their full participation in the attorney-client relationship,
“there is no magical age at which young people become capable of making
good decisions.”158 Zealous advocacy on behalf of a child client requires
the attorney’s willingness to defer to that client, but also may depend on the
child’s ability to make and communicate the necessary decisions.159 Some
attorneys view maturity on a sliding scale; the more mature the client, the
more weight is given to the child’s preferences.160 Attorneys may be
particularly challenged in deferring to children, who may have “a limited
fund of information, sometimes lack the capacity to engage in effective
cognitive reasoning, often exercise poor and/or short-sighted value
judgments, and frequently err in predicting future outcomes.”161 Generally,
lawyers struggle with representation when a client vacillates frequently or
if the client is overly dependent on the lawyer and seeks to cede all
decisions to the lawyer. These challenges can arise even more frequently
when the client is a child or a person with a disability.162 Children may
also be prone to particular kinds of mistakes, including a preference for
short-term over long-term thinking.163
However, with appropriate engagement and counseling by their
attorneys, many children will be able to effectively make certain decisions
and direct their attorneys during the course of a case. The attorney should
take care to ensure that the child understands what this relationship means.
If the child is aware that she has an attorney acting on her behalf and at her
direction, she can better take advantage of the lawyer’s services by
bringing issues to the lawyer’s attention, discussing options, and sharing
sensitive information.164 The attorney should also play an integral role in
enhancing the child’s ability to participate effectively as a client.165 For
example, the child’s decision-making capacity is promoted when an
attorney effectively earns the child client’s trust, helps the child client
and may be intermittent. The child’s ability to contribute to a determination of his or
her position is functional, depending upon the particular position and the circumstances
prevailing at the time the position must be determined. Therefore, a child may be able
to determine some positions in the case but not others. Similarly, a child may be able
to direct the lawyer with respect to a particular issue at one time but not at another.”
158. Henning, supra note 147, at 317.
159. Id. at 270-71.
160. Angela D. Lurie, Representing the Child Client: Kids Are People Too, 11
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 205, 233-34 (1993).
161. Henning, supra note 147, at 271.
162. Herr, supra note 143, at 614.
163. Peter Margulies, The Lawyer as Caregiver: Child Client’s Competence in
Context, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473, 1475 (1996).
164. Buss, supra note 21, at 1745.
165. Henning, supra note 147, at 272-73.
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understand her directive role, and empowers the child client to make her
own decisions and not simply defer to the lawyer.166 If the child
understands that she has an advocate who will press her position against all
odds, she will discover and use her own voice and her own power.167
Where a client has limitations related to age, maturity, or disability, the
attorney may struggle with whether to act on the client’s expressed interests
or best interests. For example, where the attorney does choose to represent
the child exclusively, what position will the attorney take if that child
wishes to pursue a course of action that the attorney believes to be
detrimental? Will the attorney pursue the child’s expressed interests or the
action that the attorney believes to be in the child’s best interests? In any
lawyer-client relationship, but especially where a client’s capacity to
communicate or make decisions is limited by age or disability, a lawyer can
struggle in deciding what action to take if the client’s goals or the means to
achieve them seem to be at war with the client’s interests.168 In other areas
of law in which an attorney represents a child, there may be confusion as to
whether the attorney represents the child’s expressed wishes or best
interests.169 Traditionally, a guardian ad litem is charged with advocating
for the best interests of the child, while counsel for a child, such as counsel
appointed in a delinquency matter, will usually be charged with advocating
for the child’s expressed wishes; however, attorneys may not be clear on
which model to use in different situations.170
Proponents of a best interests model of representation of children argue
that deference and conclusive weight should not be given to a child’s
decision, and that good lawyers employ their wisdom to advise childclients to seek what is best for them, rather than obtaining a result the client
wants, but should not have.171 However, if the attorney represents the
student exclusively as her attorney in a special education matter, without
different guidance from a judge who may have appointed the attorney or
from relevant court rules or practice standards, ethical rules require that the
attorney maintain as normal an attorney-client relationship as possible,
even if the child is a minor or has diminished capacity.172 This obligation
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 272-73, 319.
Buss, supra note 21, at 1745.
Herr, supra note 143, at 614-15.
See JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE
PROCEEDINGS 36-40 (3d ed. 2007); Buss, supra note 21, at 1700-05 (discussing the
debate that generally divides people into two camps: those favoring a “traditional
attorney’s” role—representing what the child client wants, or the child’s “expressed
interests”—and those favoring a guardian ad litem’s role—representing what the
lawyer determines to be in the child’s “best interest”).
170. PETERS, supra note 169, at 36-40.
171. Lurie, supra note 160, at 208.
172. D.C. R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.14(a) (2011).
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means that the attorney should pursue the student’s expressed interests
wherever possible, even if the student’s capacity to make adequately
considered decisions in connection with the representation is diminished,
whether because of minority or disability or both.173 The principle of
“normalization” requires that attorneys work directly with their clients with
disabilities in a “normalized,” or “typical” attorney-client relationship by
involving them in the representation and consulting them.174 Because
individuals with disabilities should be afforded culturally normative ends
through culturally normative means, they are entitled to representation by
attorneys who are diligent, competent, and communicative, just like
individuals without disabilities.175
Lawyers have sometimes acted swiftly to waive the rights of clients
with mental disabilities or acted on their own volition on decisions that
should belong to the client.176 Lawyers for individuals with disabilities
often exert considerable control over the lives of their clients, and there is a
high risk that they may dominate their clients and usurp decisions they
would reserve for clients without disabilities, exhibiting paternalism that
draws on images and stereotypes.177 Lawyers may also be tempted to set
goals for the representation and make important decisions for their clients
rather than deferring to their clients or engaging them in this process.
Client-centered counseling can be time consuming and challenging, but the
challenges for attorneys may be magnified where the client has cognitive
limitations or emotional instability,178 leading some attorneys to decline to
make the necessary effort to engage the client. These risks may be
heightened when the client is a child with a disability—or a parent with a
disability—to whom an attorney might be hesitant to defer when the stakes
are as high as a child’s education or safety at school.
173. Id.
174. Mickenberg, supra note 57, at 626. Current terminology in the disability rights

field seeks to avoid the normal-abnormal dichotomy, and instead refers to the
typicality. Similarly, the adaptation of Rule 1.14 of the Model Rules by the District of
Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct refers to the “typical” attorney-client
relationship, rather than the “normal” attorney-client relationship. D.C. R. OF PROF’L
CONDUCT 1.14(a).
175. Herr, supra note 143, at 619.
176. Legal representation on behalf of individuals with disabilities has been plagued
historically with inadequate effort, unjustified compromise of clients’ rights, and
distorted perception of legal ethics. A number of concerns are raised when attorneys
are in a position in which they are making decisions that are properly those of the
client. One of the principal checks on inadequate assistance of counsel is eliminated.
Mickenberg, supra note 57, at 627.
177. Herr, supra note 143, at 611.
178. Id.; see also ELLMANN ET AL., supra note 36, at 110 (emphasizing the
importance of client-centered representation and engagement, especially with clients
who may articulate their concerns, or recount their stories, in a less-straightforward
way than would so-called typical clients).
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The Model Rules emphasize the importance of client decision-making
and remind lawyers that a client with diminished capacity often has the
ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters
affecting the client’s own well-being.179 The comments to Rule 1.14
specifically note that children as young as five or six, and certainly those of
ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in
legal proceedings concerning their custody.180 This guidance can be useful
in the special education context as well, and weigh in favor of a model of
representation based on the expressed interests of the client or clients,
rather than the best interests as determined by the lawyer, even if the client
is a child—or parent—with a disability.
Although the Model Rules call for normalization in the attorney-client
relationship with a minor or person with a disability, they do allow for
some deviation from an expressed interests model in certain situations.
When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished
capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless
action is taken, and cannot adequately act in her own interest, the lawyer
can take reasonably necessary protective action.181 Such action may
include consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take
action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the
appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator, or guardian.182
This approach may involve attorneys using “substituted judgment,” or
making decisions on behalf of an incapacitated client based on what the
client would decide if the client were competent.183 The substituted
judgment model differs from best interests advocacy in its aim of honoring
client loyalty and dignity by replicating the client’s wishes, as opposed to
emphasizing the attorney’s wishes, to the greatest extent possible.184 This
179.
180.
181.
182.

D.C. R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.14(a) cmt. 1.
Id.
D.C. R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.14(b) cmt. 5.
Id. In taking any protective action, the lawyer should be guided by the wishes
and values of the client to the extent known and the client’s best interests and ensure
that any intrusion into the client’s decision-making autonomy is as minimal as possible,
maximizing client capacities and respecting the client’s family and social connections.
183. Henning, supra note 147, at 303. The attorney would attempt to formulate a
position based on what the child-client would want if he were able to adequately
comprehend the situation and verbalize his opinions, considering any information
obtainable from the child, as well as the opinions of individuals who know the child,
similarly situated individuals, and any professionals who could shed light on the child’s
interests. Lurie, supra note 160, at 234-35. The attorney would determine “what
choices a competent person with the characteristics, tastes, preferences, history and
prospects the incompetent would make to maximize his interests or wants—both those
he presently has and those he is likely to have in the future.” Id. at 235 (quoting John
A. Robertson, Organ Donations By Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment
Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 48, 65 (1976)).
184. Henning, supra note 147, at 303.
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model purports to be less vulnerable to the influence of the attorney’s own
personal, subjective judgment as to what is best for the client.185 Contrary
to a best interests judgment, substituted judgment “commends itself simply
because of its straightforward respect for the integrity and autonomy of the
individual,” focusing not on what the child should want, but what the child
would want.186 While the line may be blurry, when the attorney resorts to
protective measures in the limited circumstances provided for by the Model
Rules, the attorney should take care not to decide what she would do in that
situation or what she thinks is best for the client, but instead should use a
substituted judgment model to do what the client would want if he were
able to decide for himself and express that decision.187 When an attorney
substitutes her own judgment for that of a client’s, she should do so as
thoughtfully as possible, given that such decision-making involves a high
degree of speculation, as well as arbitrariness.188
If a guardian or other representative has already been appointed for the
client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to that representative for decisions
on behalf of the client where protective action is required.189 In matters
involving a minor, whether the lawyer should look to the parents or natural
guardians may depend on the type of proceeding or matter in which the
lawyer is representing the minor.190 In a special education matter,
depending on the attorney’s interpretation of the IDEA, the parent may
already be the recognized representative of the student under the statute,
meaning that the lawyer would look to the parent if protective action is
required. Generally, the unique significance of the parent under special
education law further complicates the lawyer’s assessment of whether he
may represent the student independently without involvement of the parent
and without regard to the wishes of the parent, or whether the parent could
or should play a role where the child is the client and protective action is
required.191
185. Id.
186. Lyon, Speaking for a Child, supra note 46, at 702 (quoting Superintendent of

Beldertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass. 1990)).
187. Lurie, supra note 160, at 235. For a comprehensive discussion of the
application of the substituted judgment doctrine to representation of children, see
generally Lyon, Speaking for a Child, supra note 46.
188. Henning, supra note 147, at 305.
189. D.C. R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.14(b) cmt. 4 (2011).
190. Id.
191. Some scholars argue that school boards should seek the appointment of a
guardian ad litem for a special education student whose desires conflict with those of
their parents, essentially attempting to sever the interests of the children from those of
their parents. Charles J. Russo, The Rights of Non-Attorney Parents Under the IDEA:
Winkleman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 221 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 15 (2007). Such a system
could potentially provide representation of the substantive interests of students at IEP
meetings, although a guardian ad litem is not necessarily charged with advocating for
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Attorneys deciding on a model of representation in a special education
case should take into account the child’s age, maturity and capacity for
decision-making, but should realize that attorneys can take steps to enhance
the child’s capacity. Once the child is included as a client, attorneys should
follow the guidance of the Model Rules in maintaining as normal an
attorney-client relationship as possible. If protective measures are
necessary, substituted judgment is preferable to advocacy based on the
attorney’s determination of best interests. If attorneys suspect that they
might have to resort to protective measures, they should consider including
a parent in the representation, barring any conflicts of interest or inability
or unwillingness on the parent’s part to participate, so as to avoid a
situation in which the attorney is in fact the individual driving the decisionmaking.
F. Children Who Have Reached the Age of Majority
Under the IDEA, when students reach the age of majority, depending on
state law, they may become the educational decision-makers and retain all
of the rights that their parents previously possessed under Part B of the
IDEA.192 States have discretion as to whether to allow the transfer of rights
to occur at the age of majority, and that age is based on the laws in each
individual state.193 In many jurisdictions, such as the District of Columbia
and North Carolina, the age of majority is eighteen.194 The rights accorded
to parents also transfer to children who are incarcerated in an adult or
juvenile state or local correctional institution.195 Specifically, all of the
rights accorded to the parent under Part B of the IDEA transfer to the
child.196 This transfer includes, but is not limited to, the right to participate
in IEP meetings, the right to participate in placement decisions, the right to
provide informed consent for evaluations, and the right to present a

the expressed desires of a child. Instead, guardians ad litem usually pursue the best
interests of the child, which are grounded in the guardian ad litem’s own views of the
child’s best interests. This type of system would conflict with principles of clientcenteredness and maintenance of a normalized attorney-client relationship, as required
by the Model Rules.
192. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.520 (2011).
193. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m); 34 C.F.R. § 300.520.
194. N.C. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, POLICIES GOVERNING SERVICES FOR
CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES, N.C. § 1503-4.1(c) (2010); D.C. MUN. REGS., tit. 5, § E3023.1 (2010).
195. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m)(1)(D); 34 C.F.R. § 300.520(a)(2).
196. Not later than one year before the student reaches the age of majority, the
school district must inform the student of those rights under the IDEA, if any, that will
transfer when the student reaches the age of majority. The IEP must also include a
statement that the student was informed about this transfer.
20 U.S.C. §
1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)(cc); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(c).
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complaint for a due process hearing.197 When the transfer of rights occurs,
the school district is required to provide notice of the transfer to both the
student and the parent. Once the transfer of rights occurs, the school
district must continue to provide legally required notices to the parent and
also provide them to the adult student. This obligation includes notices
such as prior written notices and notices about IEP meetings.198 If the
rights previously belonging to the parent under the IDEA have in fact
transferred to a student, the attorney should consider representing the
student exclusively, especially given that the parent does not retain any
rights under the IDEA in that situation.
However, the IDEA explicitly provides that the rights accorded to
parents do not transfer to children who have been determined incompetent
under state law when they reach the age of majority.199 Instead, the parents
retain their own rights under the IDEA.200 Even where a child has not been
deemed incompetent under state law, if that child does not have the ability
to provide informed consent with respect to her educational program, there
must be state-established procedures for appointing the parent of the child
or, where unavailable, another appropriate individual, to represent the
child’s educational interests when the child reaches the age of majority
through the duration of her special education eligibility.201 Neither the
IDEA nor its accompanying regulations provide a standard for making this
determination.202 Where a parent or other guardian retains rights under the
IDEA even after the child reaches the age of majority, the attorney should
include the parent in the representation in some way, and also consider
including the adult student in the representation, barring any conflicts of
interest.
Local statutes and regulations can assist attorneys in determining if their
jurisdiction has adopted the transfer of rights provision of the IDEA.203 If
the transfer of rights is applicable in an attorney’s jurisdiction, then the
attorney needs to know the specific age of majority and how an individual
is deemed incompetent in that state. In some states, like North Carolina,
the standard for the determination of competency is included in the state’s
special education statutes or regulations.204 If this information is not
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(m)(1)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.520(a)(1)(ii).
20 U.S.C. § 1415(m)(1)(A).
20 U.S.C. § 1415(m)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.520(a).
20 U.S.C. § 1415(m)(2).
20 U.S.C. § 1415(m)(2); 34 C.F.R. § 300.520(b).
For a comprehensive analysis of the transfer of rights at age of majority,
including the exceptions for students found incompetent or unable to provide informed
consent with respect to their educational programs, see Rebore & Zirkel, supra note 78.
203. See, e.g., D.C. MUN. REGS., tit. 5, § E-3023.1 (2011).
204. POLICIES GOVERNING SERVICES FOR CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES, N.C. §
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included in these sources, then the attorney will have to research related
statutes and regulations, such as those that provide for the appointment of a
guardian for an individual deemed to lack capacity.
Because a student to whom rights are transferred at the age of majority
becomes the holder of educational rights instead of the parent, an attorney
providing special education representation in this situation should in most
circumstances represent the student exclusively because the parent retains
no rights under the IDEA.205 If the attorney is representing the parent
exclusively, or the parent and child jointly before the child has reached the
age of majority, and there is a possibility that the representation may be
ongoing when the student reaches that age, the attorney should consider
planning with the parent and student at the outset of the representation how
the representation will change, if at all, when the student reaches the age of
majority. For example, the attorney and parent may decide that the
attorney will terminate representation of the parent at that time and begin
representing the student exclusively or the parties may agree that the
student should seek separate representation from another attorney at that
time.
In determining with the parties if and how the representation might
change once the student reaches the age of majority, the attorney should
consider any relevant conflicts issues. If the attorney represents the parent
while the child is a minor, the attorney retains some loyalty to the parent as
a former client even after the representation of the parent is terminated.206
The attorney should also consider any practical challenges that might be
raised by a change in representation from the parent serving as the client or
parent and student jointly serving as clients to a model in which the student
is the sole client after the age of majority. A student might be accustomed
to her parent working with the lawyer and making educational decisions.
She might not easily assume the client role when she formally becomes the
exclusive client and similarly, the parent might not easily cede the
decision-making authority. If a student who reaches the age of majority
still wants the parent to remain involved in the legal matter, she can choose
to include the parent informally or may explore the option of a power of
attorney ceding special education or general educational decision-making
rights to the parent, even though these rights belong to the student at that
time. However, such an arrangement might not be accepted by all
jurisdictions.

1504-1.21(b)
(June
2010),
available
http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/ec/policy/policies/policies-62010.pdf.
205. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m)(1)(B).
206. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2011).

at
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G. Conflicts of Interest
In many cases, both the parents and child will be working together to
secure the special education services and accommodations that the child
needs to make academic progress. The interests of both parents and child
will most often be aligned in a special education case, especially given that
parents will typically act in the best interests of their children.207 Where
parents or caregivers adequately represent the interests of the child,
independent representation might not be necessary.208 However, in some
cases, the interests of a parent or guardian might conflict with those of the
child or may even trample on those rights, leading to concerns about
conflicts of interest within joint representation.209
Whenever legal representation in a single matter involves multiple
parties, conflicts of interest may arise.210 In special education cases,
conflicts of interest could arise among multiple parents or caregivers being
represented by an attorney in a special education matter. Conflicts might
also arise between a parent and child, particularly where a teenager is able
to communicate her wishes and interests. Examples of such conflicts
include situations in which a parent is acting against a child’s legal
interests, the parent and child disagree over educational goals and services,
or a parent is unable or unwilling to advocate for the child’s educational
207. “[H]istorically [the law] has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead
parents to act in the best interests of their children.” Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602
(1979) (leaving the decision to commit a child to a state mental institution largely with
the parents); see also Lois A. Weithorn, Children’s Capacities for Participation in
Treatment Decision–Making, in EMERGING ISSUES IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW
22, 22 (Elissa P. Benedek & Diane H. Schetky eds., 1985) (explaing parents typically
make decisions in the ‘best interests’ of their children).
208. Leonard P. Edwards, A Comprehensive Approach to the Representation of
Children: The Child Advocacy Coordinator Council, 27 FAM. L. Q. 417, 418 (1993).
209. One domestic relations court opined, “[W]e have long noted in the reported
cases dealing with children’s rights a tendency to identify them with parental rights, i.e.
to regard them as identical. This is quite understandable, but not always correct. One
doesn’t have to work in a family court very long to learn that in countless
circumstances a juvenile’s rights and interests . . . are at sharp variance with those of
his parents.” In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128, 130 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1962) (ordering a blood
transfusion for the child despite the parent’s religious beliefs).
210. If a special education attorney represents the parent alone and the attorney and
parent are clear that the parent alone will direct the representation, then there is no need
for an analysis of conflicts of interest, regardless of any disagreements or other
conflicts of interests between parent and child, because the parent’s wishes will control.
Moore, supra note 1, at 1824. Conflicts of interest with the child may present
challenges more broadly, but would generally not affect the representation of the parent
or alter the attorney-client relationship where the parent is the client and directs the
representation. The same would be true in regards to the attorney’s loyalty to the child
and her expressed interests, regardless of a disagreement by the parent, if the child were
the sole client. If the attorney represents either the parent or the child exclusively, she
has an ethical responsibility to advocate zealously to pursue the singular client’s
expressed wishes alone. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 2 (2011) (“As
advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position . . . .”).
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rights.211 While conflicts between parents and children are far more likely
in a family court setting that might involve abuse, neglect, confinement or
institutionalization as a result of delinquency or mental illness, custody, or
disputes about medical treatment, conflicts may similarly arise in the
special education context between the goals, interests and values of the
child and a parent or parents.212 For example, a parent could seek to
commit a child to a residential treatment facility through the special
education process in order to end the psychological and financial strain of
keeping the child at home or simply because the parent is unaware of
alternatives to institutionalization.213 In these cases, the parent’s goal might
conflict with the child’s liberty interests or with the child’s expressed desire
to remain at home and in the community.214
Where the child has special education needs, but abuse, neglect, truancy,
and/or delinquency are also at issue, conflicts may be more likely to arise.
For example, the facts underlying a juvenile status offense charge, such as
truancy from school, running away from home, or misbehavior at school
and at home, can lead to a conflict of interest for an attorney seeking to
represent both parent and youth.215 A teenager facing truancy charges
might have missed school at the parent’s direction to care for younger
siblings, or the refusal to obey the parent might stem from domestic

211. Godsoe, All in the Family, supra note 20, at 21-26. Godsoe advocates for a
family representation model in special education cases in which the attorney represents
the family as a whole, but takes care to clarify that parents and child are the client. She
argues that this model allows the attorney to take a more communal view of the case,
incorporating the parties’ interests, their concern for other family members and the
parent-child dyad as a whole. She distinguishes her model from those in which
parents’ attorneys ignore the child’s view and those in which children’s attorneys fail to
make use of parents’ knowledge about their children. Moreover, she advocates that the
attorney has a special duty to the child and should not follow the parent’s direction
without an independent assessment of the child’s legal interests and any potential
conflicts. Pursuant to the proposed model, if the lawyer believes the parent is acting so
as to infringe upon the child’s rights, the lawyer should cease communal representation
and take protective action such as using a best interests model or substituted judgment,
as contemplated by Model Rule 1.14, or communicate the lawyer’s concerns to a court
or hearing officer, even if they are adverse to the parent’s interests, to safeguard the
threatened interests of the child. Id. at 37-48. Her proposed model is innovative and
draws on other areas of law in which collaborative family representation is used, such
as family business, estate planning, and elder law. However, if an attorney is in a
position to withdraw from representation of the parent to take protective action on
behalf of child, there is a risk that the attorney will be inserting her own subjective
view of the child’s legal interests, at the expense of the parent’s right to make special
education decisions and at the expense of the parent’s opportunity to maintain the
representation to which the attorney originally committed.
212. Herr, supra note 143, at 628.
213. Mickenberg, supra note 57, at 628.
214. Id.
215. Tulman, Special Education Advocacy and Status Offense Charges, supra note
22, at 100.
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violence between the parents or from direct abuse of the youth.216
Although separate representation could avoid issues raised by such
conflicts, joint representation in the special education matter might allow
the attorney to assist the youth and the parent in addressing the underlying
issues that led to a status offense.217
Under a standard conflicts analysis, the ethical propriety of joint
representation of a parent, multiple parents or caregivers, and/or a child
should be determined prior to the initiation of the representation by
identification of any potentially impermissible conflicts, a determination of
whether any such conflicts are waivable, and the procurement of voluntary
consent after disclosure for those conflicts that are waivable.218 The
requirement that a client have the “legal capacity to give consent” in such
situations may be problematic for a young child or a child with severe
disabilities who is unable to express her wishes.219 Where the potential for
conflict seems remote, a parent is not prevented from consenting to joint
representation on behalf of both herself and her child,220 but the attorney
could not ethically allow a parent to waive a conflict on behalf of a child
and pursue joint representation where the conflict exists with that same
parent.
Beyond the initial conflicts of interest analysis at the point the
representation begins, the attorney must remain alert as to any concurrent
conflicts of interest that might arise during the course of joint
representation. The Model Rules provide that a lawyer should not
represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of
interest, which happens if the representation of one client is directly
adverse to another client or there is a significant risk that the representation
of a client will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to
another client.221 The lawyer can proceed with the representation of a
client, despite a concurrent conflict of interest, if the lawyer reasonably
believes that she will be able to provide competent and diligent
representation to each affected client, the representation is not prohibited
by law, the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one
client against another represented by the lawyer in the same proceeding
before a tribunal, and each affected client gives written informed

216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.
Id.
Moore, supra note 1, at 1831.
Id. at 1835; see also Herr, Legal Representation, supra note 36, at 77-94
(discussing generally the capacity of individuals with intellectual disabilities to enter
into and sustain an attorney-client relationship).
220. Moore, supra note 1, at 1839.
221. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2010).
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consent.222 As described above, there may be similar concerns about a
child’s ability to consent to continued representation when a concurrent
conflict of interest arises.223
Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Winkelman, a parent
representing her own interests is likely also representing her child’s interest
in a free appropriate public education.224 Although the Court in Winkelman
cited to the First Circuit’s decision in Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Regional
School District,225 the Court did not resolve the First Circuit’s concern that
the recognition of parents as aggrieved parties is problematic because
“[c]hildren whose interests are advanced by parents who sue pro se may
not have the best advocates. Parents may be emotionally involved and not
exercise rational and independent judgment.”226 Sometimes, parents might
“experience anger toward the school officials, each other and even the
child.”227 It remains unclear what would happen if a child in need of
special education services alleged that her parent failed to represent her
interests adequately or ignored her wishes in developing her IEP.228 The
rights of a parent and child under the IDEA are intertwined, but also
distinct.229 In maintaining this paradox, the Winkelman decision did not
clarify what would happen if a special education student who is a minor
disagrees with her parents, and it is uncertain whether the parent and child
would be able to litigate their claims separately.230 The status of a minor
222. Id. at R. 1.7(b).
223. If the lawyer believes there is a concurrent conflict of interest, as defined in

Model Rule 1.7(a) and discussed above, but chooses to proceed in representation and
seek informed consent from both the parent and student to continue the multiple
representation, the attorney needs to make both parties aware of the implications of the
common representation, including possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality and the
attorney-client privilege, and the advantages and risks involved. MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 18.
224. Logan Steiner, Playing Lawyers: The Implications of Endowing Parents with
Substantive Rights Under IDEA in Winkelman v. Parma City School District, 127 S.
Ct. 1994 (2007), 31 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 1169, 1180 (2008).
225. 346 F.3d 247, 258 (1st Cir. 2003).
226. Id. at 258.
227. Petrera, supra note 2, at 544 (citing PETER W. D. WRIGHT, REPRESENTING THE
SPECIAL EDUCATION CHILD: A MANUAL FOR THE ATTORNEY AND LAY ADVOCATE (Jan.
21, 2009), http://www.wrightslaw.com/advoc/articles/attorney_manual.html).
228. Russo, supra note 191, at 15.
229. Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 531-32
(2007).
230. It is possible that a guardian ad litem or other next friend who is not the parent
could be appointed where a parent is not adequately representing the child’s interests or
where there may be a conflict of interest. See, e.g., Muse B. v. Upper Darby Sch. Dist.,
No. 06-CV-00343, 2007 WL 2973709 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2007) (appointing a guardian
ad litem to represent the child’s special education interests when the parent had
repeatedly fired counsel); see also Herr, Legal Representation, supra note 36, at 85
(citing Developmental Disability Advocacy Center, Inc. v. Melton, 689 F. 2d 281,
285 (1st Cir. 1982)) (“[A]lthough the parent of a child with a disability will generally
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student’s rights related to the contents of her IEP, apart from the wishes of
her parents, is uncertain. If students under the age of majority do not have
their own rights under the IDEA, there might be a concern that special
education students who are minors are “harnessed” to the decisions of their
parents without opportunities to express their own desires.231
Where the attorney jointly represents the parent and child, the retainer
agreement should contain an explanation regarding any potential conflict of
interest, including the possibility that they might disagree on the objectives
of the representation.232 The retainer agreement should also describe the
consequence, such as withdrawal of representation of both parties, should
an unresolvable and unwaivable conflict occur. Attorneys should also
check the rules of professional responsibility in their own state to see if
those rules provide additional guidance for common representation of both
parent and student.
An attorney who jointly represents a parent and child can cite to the
intertwined nature of their special education rights in support of this model.
Conversely, concerns that a child’s voice will not be heard or could even be
silenced in joint representation, as well as concerns about other types of
conflicts of interest between parents and child, can be used to justify
individual and sole representation of a child by a special education
attorney. Where an attorney who has instead decided to jointly represent a
parent and child is confronted with this type of conflict, in many situations,
the attorney should counsel the parent and child about the child’s rights and
the alternatives and help the parent and child to find a mutually agreeable
solution. For example, where a more restrictive alternative such as a
residential treatment facility might be of interest to a parent, the parent may
change her mind once she learns that the child has a right to be educated in
the least restrictive appropriate environment and that the attorney can use
that legal mandate to advocate for additional services on the IEP or a new
day school placement that would allow the child to stabilize and remain in
the community. Special education attorneys who do represent the parent
and child jointly are often able to mediate such conflicts between parents

receive preference over an outsider’s proposed representation, an unrelated next friend,
guardian ad litem, or more distant relative may be appointed when the parent has an
interest that may conflict with the interests of the minor that parent is supposed to
represent.”).
231. Russo, supra note 191, at 15 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245-46
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part)).
232. Tulman, Special Education Advocacy and Status Offense Charges, supra note
22, at 100 n.64. The retainer agreement probably should contain an explanation
regarding the potential conflict of interest between the parent and the child, including
the possibility that they might disagree on the objectives of the special education
representation. An irresolvable and unwaivable conflict likely would lead to the
withdrawal by the attorney from the representation. Id.
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and their children when they do arise.233 However there will be times when
a conflict between multiple clients in a special education case will be
irresolvable.234 The lawyer may be forced to withdraw if the common
representation is not effective.235 Due to the difficulty of securing legal
representation in special education matters, withdrawal often leaves the
family with no representation whatsoever. In determining whether to
jointly represent both parties, the lawyer should keep in mind that the
family members may not be able to secure alternate representation if the
common representation fails.236
H. Attorney-Client Confidentiality
The attorney-client privilege prohibits an attorney from revealing
information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives
informed consent or the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry
out the representation.237 Between commonly represented clients, the
prevailing rule is that the attorney-client privilege does not attach.238
Therefore, when an attorney is jointly representing the parent and child,
communications between the attorney and the parent are not confidential as
to the child, and communications between the attorney and the child can
similarly be shared with the parent. The parent and child will need to
clearly understand this alteration to the traditional attorney-client privilege
prior to agreeing to representation. Because the lawyer has an equal duty
of loyalty to each client, and each client has the right to be informed of
anything bearing on the representation and the right to use that information
to the client’s benefit, common representation will be problematic if one
client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information
relevant to the representation.239 As a result, if the student or parent
233. Interview with William Koski, Eric and Nancy Wright Professor of Clinical
Education and Director of Youth and Education Law Clinic, Stanford Law School
(October 22, 2011); Interview with Dean Rivkin, supra note 85.
234. It may also be difficult for the lawyer to remain impartial when there are
conflicts. When the lawyer agrees with one client more than the other and when it is
unlikely that impartiality can be maintained, representation of multiple clients is
improper. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 29 (2010). Unless otherwise
established at the outset of the representation, an irresolvable and unwaivable conflict
likely would lead to withdrawal from representation by an attorney jointly representing
parent and child in a special education matter. Tulman, Special Education Advocacy
and Status Offense Charges, supra note 22, at 100 n.64.
235. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 29.
236. Id. Moreover, a lawyer cannot undertake common representation when
contentious negotiations between the clients are imminent or contemplated. Id.
237. Id. at R. 1.6(a). The Model Rule also provides for additional narrow limited
circumstances in which the attorney may reveal confidential information related to the
representation.
238. Id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 30.
239. Id. at cmt. 31.
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discloses information relevant to the representation, and requests that the
lawyer not share this information with the other party, the lawyer will need
to end the common representation, unless the lawyer appropriately counsels
the disclosing client, who then decides that sharing the information with the
other party is acceptable.
Attorney-client confidentiality may weigh in favor of the attorney
choosing to represent the child exclusively, where that protection might
incentivize the child to be more open to sharing information with the
attorney. If the attorney suspects that the child will be hesitant to confide
in the attorney out of concern that the information might be shared with a
parent or school official, the attorney can overcome that obstacle through
the establishment of the attorney-client privilege with a child client and by
ensuring that the child, where she is the sole client, understands the
Where the attorney represents a child
confidentiality principle.240
independently and exclusively, the child client may still choose to have
parents, family members, or other individuals participate in discussions
with the lawyer. When necessary to assist in the representation, the
presence of such persons generally does not affect the applicability of the
attorney-client evidentiary privilege and those communications will remain
privileged.241 Even where the client is exclusively the child, with the
child’s permission, the lawyer may improve the effectiveness of the
representation in this way by communicating with parents or caregivers,
who often are the most important individuals in the child’s life, without
jeopardizing the attorney-client privilege.242 However, even where the
lawyer communicates with other individuals, the lawyer must keep the
client’s interests foremost and look to the child and not family members to
make decisions on the child client’s behalf.243
I. The Child’s Involvement in Child Welfare Proceedings
A family’s involvement in the child welfare system may influence an
attorney’s decision as to the model of representation to use in a special
education matter. Children involved in abuse/neglect proceedings often
have unmet special education needs and may require legal assistance to
secure appropriate special education services. Those children who have
been removed from their parents and placed in foster care in particular
often perform below grade level academically and receive special

240. For a discussion of the importance of attorney-client confidentiality with child
clients in special education cases, see generally Petrera, supra note 2, at 548-52.
241. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 3 (2010).
242. Gottlieb, supra note 53, at 1273.
243. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 3 (2010).
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education services at higher rates than the general population.244 Many of
these are not receiving the appropriate special education and other
educational services needed to address their difficulties.245 Generally, the
educational needs of children in foster care go unmet because of the
instability they experience as a result of multiple placements and the lack,
at times, of adults to take responsibility in helping these children be
successful in school. Children in foster care are also more likely to have
their special education needs in particular go undetected due to the absence
of an effective advocate or “parent.”246
When children involved in the child welfare system require special
education legal representation, the attorney faces the challenge of
determining which individual or individuals hold the educational rights for
the child, or who can serve as the “parent” under the IDEA. Students
involved in the child welfare system may not have long-standing
relationships with an adult figure as a result of movement among foster
care placements and schools. Although the statute provides a number of
options as to who can serve as a “parent,” such as an appointed surrogate247
or a foster parent where the latter is not prohibited by state law,248 where
the “parent” is a new foster parent or an appointed surrogate, that
individual may not know the child at all. Even where there is a caring and
steady adult involved in the life of the child, more pressing concerns such
as safety, shelter, and permanency might trump the importance of advocacy
regarding the child’s educational needs.249 Similarly, an individual who
retains educational decision-making rights, such as a parent for whom those
rights technically have not been limited, may not have physical custody at
the start of the special education representation or maintain physical
244. Kathleen Kelly, The Education Crisis for Children in the California Juvenile
Court System, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 757, 759 (2000). As many as 75% of youth
in foster care perform below grade level, 50-80% have been retained at least one year
in school, and more than 50% of children in foster care do not graduate from high
school. Id. at 759.
245. Brandy Miller, Falling Between the Cracks: Why Foster Children Are Not
Receiving Appropriate Special Education Services, 5 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM.
ADVOC. 547, 548 (2006) (citing Kathleen Kelly, The Educational Crisis for Children
in the California Juvenile Court System, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 757, 757-58
(2002)).
246. Cynthia Godsoe, Caught Between Two Systems: How Exceptional Children in
Out-of-Home Care Are Denied Equality in Education, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 81,
106 (2000); Miller, supra note 245, at 558-59.
247. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2)(A) (2006).
248. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(23)(A); see 34 C.F.R. § 300.20(b)(1)-(2) (2011) (limiting the
circumstances when a foster parent may act as a parent, if the following criteria are
met: (1) the educational rights of the natural parents have been extinguished under state
law; (2) the foster parent has an ongoing, long-term relationship with the child; (3) the
foster parent is willing to make educational decisions on behalf of the child; and (4)
there is no conflict with the child’s interest).
249. Valverde, A New IDEA, supra note 61, at 16.
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custody throughout the duration of the representation.
Many children involved in abuse/neglect proceedings will be appointed
counsel or guardians ad litem in connection with those proceedings who
can advocate for a child’s educational needs.250 However, frequently faced
with high case loads, intensive demands for advocacy around safety and
permanency issues, and a lack of familiarity with special education law,
attorneys and guardians ad litem representing children in child welfare
proceedings often cannot focus on the educational needs of each child,
especially if extensive advocacy is required to secure appropriate special
education services. Children involved in the abuse/neglect system, who are
more likely to have poor educational outcomes, may need a separate
advocate focused solely upon their educational needs.251
With this recognition, some states have created a system for the separate
appointment of education or special education attorneys for children in the
child welfare system.252 For example, the Juvenile Division of the Los
Angeles County Superior Court established protocols providing for the
appointment of an education attorney in dependency cases “to represent the
best educational interests of the minor,”253 rather than the expressed
interests of the child or the parent (or other educational rights holder). The
attorney’s only duty of confidentiality is to the child.254 The parent or other
educational rights holder is instructed to work in cooperation with the
education attorney to advocate for and receive an appropriate placement
and services for the child,255 but is not the attorney’s “client.” Where the
250. See AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT
CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES 2, 7-10 (1996) (advising that attorneys and
guardians ad litem actively involve themselves in the clients’ education by attending
any meetings regarding the child, identifying educational support programs,
investigating school records, interviewing school personnel, and requesting special
education services, if applicable); see also N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR
ATTORNEYS REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN NEW YORK CHILD PROTECTIVE, FOSTER
CARE, AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDINGS 12 (2007), available at
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Law_Guardian_Representation_Sta
ndards&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=11559
(explaining
that
attorneys should seek educational services to protect a child’s interest and use court
orders to obtain these services, if necessary).
251. See Rebekah Gleason Hope, Foster Children and the Idea: The Fox No Longer
Guarding the Henhouse?, 69 LA. L. REV. 349, 353 (2009) (discussing how school
systems and courts may appoint an educational surrogate parent to advocate for the
educational needs of children in foster care who have disabilities).
252. Miller, supra note 245, at 574.
253. RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF EDUCATION ATTORNEY/ADVOCATE AND
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS HOLDER PURSUANT TO WIC §
317(E) OR CRC § 5.663 APPOINTMENT FOR EDUCATION ADVOCACY AND
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT (Juv. Div., Super. Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty.)
[hereinafter LOS ANGELES CNTY. APPOINTMENT OF EDUCATION ATTORNEY] (emphasis
added).
254. Id.
255. Id.
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education attorney does not feel the parent or other education rights holder
is acting in the child’s best interests, the education attorney can seek a court
order to remove that individual as the educational rights holder and have a
new individual appointed.256 This model of representation, as provided for
by the court, gives the appointed education attorney a strong voice in the
special education matter, perhaps even a stronger voice than the parent,257
who is not formally involved in an attorney-client relationship with the
court-appointed education attorney. By providing attorneys with the power
to determine what is in the child’s best interests and allowing the removal
from that role of a parent whose educational decision-making rights are still
intact, this model promotes the voice of the lawyer over the voice of the
parent or child, potentially at the expense of the parent’s constitutional or
statutory rights under the IDEA.
The Superior Court of the District of Columbia Family Court has also
created a panel of special education attorneys who can be appointed for
children in abuse/neglect proceedings.258 The attorney practice standards
for that panel provide that the parent is the client of a court-appointed
special education attorney pursuant to federal law, so long as the parent
retains the right to make the educational decisions on behalf of the child.259
The family court has the discretion to order the attorney to represent a
particular adult or caregiver where the rights of the parent can be limited.260
Alternatively, the special education attorney may choose to represent both
the parent or other designated adult and child pursuant to a retainer
agreement where the parent’s interests do not conflict with those of the
child.261 In comparison to the model used by the Los Angeles Superior
Court, the District of Columbia Superior Family Court model emphasizes
the parent’s rights under the IDEA by designating the parent as the client of
the court-appointed special education attorney, with full decision-making
rights, in most cases.262
256. Id.
257. With this model, the attorney has the power to determine what she feels is in

the child’s best interests and to seek removal and replacement of the educational rights
holder where the attorney disagrees with that person’s decisions and actions, even if
that person’s parental rights have not been otherwise limited by a court.
258. See generally SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DIST. OF COLUMBIA FAMILY COURT,
FAMILY COURT ATTORNEY PRACTICE STANDARDS FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION
ATTORNEYS (2003) [hereinafter D.C. SPECIAL EDUCATION ATTORNEY STANDARDS],
available at http://www.dccourts.gov/dccourts/docs/09-03Attachment.pdf.
259. Id. at 13.
260. Id. (providing that the appointment order will inform the special education
attorney and other parties who the client (educational decision maker) is for purposes
of the special education representation).
261. Id.
262. Interestingly, a consent decree arising from class action litigation in Tennessee
created an entirely different type of program for the provision of special education
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Legal services attorneys are sometimes also available to provide special
education representation to children involved in abuse/neglect proceedings.
Attorneys who provide special education legal representation to this
specialized population use different models of representation. Whereas
some view the “parent” as the client, others see the child as the client, and
still others represent both the child and parent. For example, the Children’s
Law Center (CLC) in Washington, D.C.263 has a Guardian Ad Litem
Project (GAL Project) through which its attorneys are appointed by DC
Superior Court Family Court judges to represent the best interests of
children in abuse and neglect proceedings. CLC also has a Guardian Ad
Litem Special Education Project (GAL Special Ed Project), which receives
in-house referrals for special education matters or appointments by District
of Columbia Superior Family Court judges to provide special education
representation regarding only those children who are already represented
by CLC GAL Project attorneys in their abuse/neglect proceedings.264
Although the GAL Project attorneys are appointed to represent the best
interests of the child, the attorneys within the GAL Special Ed Project
represent a “parent,” who could be either the natural parent or another
individual serving in a care-giving role such as a foster parent.265
Therefore, the GAL Special Ed Project must set some limitations on its
counsel to children in abuse/neglect proceedings, deploying attorneys employed by the
state’s child welfare agency to serve in this role. The class action complaint was
brought against the state on behalf of more than 9,000 children in the custody of
Tennessee’s Department of Children’s Services (DCS), seeking reforms to the state’s
overburdened and mismanaged child welfare system. Complaint, Brian A. v.
Sundquist, 149 F. Supp. 2d 941 (M.D. Tenn. May 10, 2000) (No. 3-00-0445). The
federal complaint charged the state with violating the constitutional rights of those
children and causing them irreparable harm. The settlement agreement created the
appointment of DCS-employed special education attorneys for children in DCS
custody to address their educational needs. Settlement Agreement at 17, Brian A. v.
Sundquist, 149 F. Supp. 2d 941 (M.D. Tenn. July 27, 2001) (No. 3-00-0445) (DCS was
charged with assigning twelve attorneys who will represent children within the custody
of DCS to ensure the children have access to a reasonable and appropriate education,
including special education services). Consequently, the settlement agreement created
a unit of attorneys in a state agency charged with providing legal representation in
special education matters, potentially in opposition to other state employees of local
and state educational agencies. These attorneys were permitted to represent the
children in IEP meetings, but not permitted to bring due process complaints, because as
employees of the state, they could not sue the state in this context. These attorneys,
and subsequently the children they represented and their parents, were unable, at least
through this type of attorney-client relationship, to enforce their due process rights if
IEP negotiations failed and a violation of FAPE needed to be remedied through an
administrative due process complaint. Interview with Dean Rivkin, supra note 85.
263. The author previously worked at the Children’s Law Center in Washington,
D.C. as an attorney with the Health Access Project.
264. Jennifer N. Rosen Valverde et al., Integrating Educational Advocacy into Child
Welfare Practice: Working Models, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER. SOC. POL’Y & L. 201, 211
(2011) [hereinafter Valverde, Educational Advocacy].
265. Id. at 212. Occasionally, CLC-SEP represents the GAL client directly where
the youth is 18 years of age or older and no conflict exists with the GAL representation.

CANNON 9/15/2011

2011]

12/8/2011 12:49:08 PM

WHO’S THE BOSS?

57

special education representation of a parent or adult caregiver. For
example, the legal assistance agreement explains to the potential client that
attorney-client confidentiality will be limited, as the attorney will share
information with the CLC guardian ad litem. Moreover, the agreement
states that CLC must terminate the representation if the special education
client and the guardian ad litem come into conflict about what is best for
the child.266
Similarly, the Special Education Clinic at Rutgers University School of
Law—Newark provides representation to “parents” of children with special
needs who are involved with the child welfare system, unless the child is
over eighteen, in which case he or she is the client. The Office of the
Public Defender Law Guardian Division in Essex County, N.J., a Court
Appointed Special Advocate or other child welfare professional can make
referrals to the Special Education Clinic. The Clinic obtains confirmation
that the person acting as the “parent” for IDEA purposes has the right to
serve in that role, a right usually clarified in a court order stating that the
person is the educational rights holder, before accepting the case for legal
representation.267 The Special Education Clinic takes this step, based on
recognition of parental rights to make educational decisions and special
education decisions in particular, so as not to usurp the authority of
biological and adoptive parents without due process.268 Because the clinic
does not provide representation in the abuse/neglect proceeding itself, the
clinic does not have to place any limitations on its representation of the
parent or other designated adult in a special education case.
Both the Children’s Law Center’s GAL Special Ed Project and the
Rutgers Special Education Clinic have faced challenges where parents or
foster parents have been unable to stay in regular communication, attend
meetings, or share information relevant to the educational matter with the
special education attorneys, sometimes leading to withdrawal of

266. Id. at 217-18. If the potential client has counsel in the abuse/neglect matter, the
agreement encourages the potential client to review the legal assistance agreement with
that attorney. The agreement also informs the potential client of her right to seek
separate counsel in the education matter elsewhere to avoid these limitations on
representation that are necessary if CLC represents that individual in the special
education case. Because CLC attorneys play two different roles, with one attorney
within the organization serving as the GAL representing the best interests of the child
and another attorney within the same organization representing an adult in the special
education matter, the potential for conflicts is higher, potentially resulting in
withdrawal from representation. Fortunately, such conflicts have arisen for CLC
attorneys in only a few, isolated cases, as most parents whom the organization has
represented recognize the importance of education and work with the special education
attorney to secure the needed services, even where they may have experienced
challenges in caring for their children in other areas of their lives. Id. at 225.
267. Id. at 217.
268. Id.
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representation.269 Where there is child welfare system involvement, a
model of special education representation in which the parent or other adult
is the client can present these types of obstacles where the client is unable
to or refuses to maintain the necessary level of engagement with the special
education advocacy.
In contrast with these models, the Legal Aid Society in New York City,
which established the Kathryn A. McDonald Education Advocacy Project
(EAP) to address the educational needs of children in the child welfare
system, takes a different approach to representation. New York City’s
Family Court appoints Legal Aid attorneys to represent children in abuse
and neglect proceedings, and those attorneys make in-house referrals to
EAP for special education representation. The EAP special education
attorney will then represent the child and not the “parent” with respect to
the child’s educational needs. EAP uses an expressed interest model,
which often requires extensive counseling of the client as to what is
possible and realistic, unless the child is too young or impaired to express
an opinion about the course of her case, and then EAP will use substituted
judgment or a best interests model.270 EAP does work with the biological
parent or educational right holders to make sure that they are on board with
the special education services that will be requested, in acknowledgement
that parents are the individuals vested with procedural rights under the
IDEA.271 Representation of the child’s expressed interests exclusively,
with some involvement of the parent, allows EAP to avoid potential
conflicts that could arise if it were to undertake dual representation of the
parent and child.272 However, this model has resulted in some obstacles
when the child’s legal capacity to independently request a due process
hearing has been challenged because it is not clear that students under the
age of majority have legal capacity to bring a due process complaint under
the IDEA, as discussed above.273
269. Id. at 226.
270. Id. at 206.
271. Id. at 226. If the parent or other education decision-maker is represented by

counsel in the abuse/neglect proceeding, EAP seeks permission from the attorney to
interview and gather supporting information from that parent and then uses this
information to develop a case plan that is consistent with the child’s wishes. Id. at 218.
Ultimately, the parent will also be asked to provide written consent to any evaluations
or services negotiated by EAP, given that neither the child nor the child’s attorney has
the right under the IDEA to consent. Id. at 226. The IDEA states that a “parent” must
provide consent prior to an initial evaluation to determine whether a child qualifies as a
child with a disability under the IDEA and prior to the initial provision of special
education and related services to the child. See 20 U.S.C. 1414(a)(1)(D) (2006); 34
C.F.R. § 300.300 (2011).
272. Valverde, Educational Advocacy, supra note 264, at 211.
273. The IDEA provides that a child’s “parent” has the right to request a hearing
pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1), but it also states that “any party” may present a
complaint. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6).
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The East Bay Children’s Law Clinic, in collaboration with area law
students, uses a different model of representation. Rather than assigning a
separate attorney for the special education matter, the Clinic facilitates the
appointment of law students as surrogate parents for children represented
by the Clinic attorneys in abuse and neglect matters. Law students who
work in the East Bay Children’s Law Clinic in Berkeley, CA, receive
referrals from the Oakland Unified School District foster care liaison for
children involved in the abuse/neglect system to serve as surrogate parents
(or “educational representatives”) to advocate on behalf of the children’s
educational needs.274 The law students are assigned to a child and are
appointed by a Juvenile Court judge to serve in this role.275 In those cases,
the Clinic continues to represent the child in the abuse/neglect matter and a
law student affiliated with the Clinic serves in a surrogate parent role.276
Attorneys providing special education representation to children
involved in child welfare proceedings may face a number of complications.
There may be confusion as to which adult holds the right to make
educational decisions for the child, or the person who does hold the rights
may not be in a position to serve effectively in the client role. Where a
surrogate or foster parent serves in the role of the “parent,” that individual
may not know the child very well or at all. Legal services organizations
that provide dual representation in both an abuse/neglect proceeding and in
a special education matter may face internal conflicts of interest where the
special education attorney represents an adult. Although there may be
challenges involved with representation of an adult in a special education
matter when the child welfare system is involved, there may be other
obstacles posed by representation of a child, such as the possible lack of
legal capacity to independently bring a due process complaint or the
difficulties raised by a child’s limited functional capacity to participate in
the attorney-client relationship, as discussed elsewhere in this Article.
Attorneys use different models of representation in special education cases
where there is child welfare involvement, and even family courts that
appoint special education attorneys provide for different models of
representation. Sometimes, even court-appointed attorneys are faced with
significant ambiguity as to their role and the identification of a client in a
special education matter. If an attorney is appointed through a family court
proceeding, it is critical to understand any requirements or guidance that
may apply in that jurisdiction or particular proceeding.

274. Interview of Stephen Rosenbaum, Lecturer, U.C. Berkeley Boalt Hall School of
Law (Dec. 30, 2010).
275. Id.
276. Id.
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J. Delinquency Cases
Statistics show a strong correlation between special education needs and
delinquency.277 A recent study showed that a median of 33% of youth in
juvenile correctional facilities have special education needs; the percentage
ranges from about 9% in some states to 77% in others.278 Given these
statistics, juvenile defense attorneys in delinquency cases will likely
uncover unmet special education needs. These defense attorneys may
themselves advocate for special education services for their clients, but
many juvenile defense attorneys have high case loads and special education
law is often outside of their expertise. Consequently, when possible,
juvenile defense attorneys may try to refer a client to a separate special
education attorney. For juvenile defense attorneys who work for public
defender or legal aid organization or student attorneys who operate within a
law school clinic, there may be special education attorneys in-house to
whom referrals can be made. Attorneys in organizations or law school
clinics that do not have in-house special education attorneys may need to
refer clients to private special education attorneys or special education
attorneys affiliated with other organizations. Some public defender
organizations have created partnerships with external special education
attorneys for this purpose.279 Private defense attorneys can also refer cases
to private special education attorneys, legal services organizations, or law
school clinics. To facilitate special education representation, some juvenile
courts have created systems for court appointment of special education
counsel.280
Some public defender organizations have in-house education counsel,
and juvenile defense attorneys can refer clients with special education
needs directly to special education attorneys within their own organization,
allowing for prompt focus on the special education issues. Models of
representation vary depending on the level of affiliation between the
juvenile defense attorneys and the special education attorneys and the
277. See generally Mary Magee Quinn et al., Youth with Disabilities in Juvenile
Corrections: A National Survey, 71 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD 339 (2005).
278. Id. at 342 (noting that beyond those who have been evaluated and determined
eligible for special education, many youth involved in delinquency proceedings have
not been evaluated at all. Accordingly, the actual percentages may be even higher).
See generally Joseph B. Tulman, Best Defense is a Good Offense: Incorporating
Special Education Law into Delinquency Representation in the Juvenile Law Clinic, 42
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 223, 226 (1992) [hereinafter Tulman, Best Defense].
279. See, e.g., OFFICE OF PROT. & ADVOCACY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES,
http://www.state.ct.us/opapd (last visited Aug. 28, 2011) (partnering with and receiving
referrals from Connecticut’s public defender office regarding advocacy for youth and
their families).
280. See, e.g., D.C. SPECIAL EDUCATION ATTORNEY STANDARDS, supra note 258
(explaining the duties of an appointed attorney chosen to represent persons in special
education matters).
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resulting impact on the loyalty to the established client in the delinquency
matter. For example, when a juvenile defense attorney at the Public
Defender Service for the District of Columbia identifies a client with
special education needs, she may make a referral for that client to an inhouse special education attorney.281 The special education attorney then
executes a retainer with both the child client and the parent for the purposes
of the education case, in part out of recognition that special education rights
inure to the parent and unless the child is eighteen and educational rights
have transferred, the child will not be deemed by hearing officers in
Washington, D.C. to have the legal capacity to independently bring a due
process complaint.282 In the event of a disagreement between parent and
child, the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia will not
represent the parent in the special education matter and the special
education attorney will instead consult with the defense attorney as to the
child’s needs, as the organization’s first duty is to the child due to its prior
commitment to and ongoing representation of the child’s expressed
interests in the delinquency matter.283 However, it is rare that unresolvable
conflicts arise.284
The University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of
Law Juvenile and Special Education Law Clinic represents youth in both
delinquency and special education matters and uses varying models of
representation, depending on the circumstances.285 If the child is first
represented by the clinic in a delinquency matter, the student attorneys will
advise her that the parent will also need to serve as a client in the special
education matter.286 If the child client chooses to go forward and a conflict
arises between parent and child, the clinic will work to resolve the
conflict.287 However, the clinic will have to withdraw from the special
education case if the conflict is unresolvable.288 When the child is not
already represented by the clinic in her delinquency matter, the clinic
sometimes uses a joint representation model, sometimes represents the
281. E-mail from Jamie Argento Rodriguez, Juvenile Services Program Coordinator,
Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia, to Jamie Sparano, Student,
American University Washington College of Law (Feb. 7, 2011 20:35 EST) (on file
with author).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. E-mail from Joseph B. Tulman, Director, Juvenile and Special Education Law
Clinic, University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law, to Yael
Zakai Cannon, Practitioner-in-Residence, American University Washington College of
Law (Mar. 20, 2011 15:47 EST) (on file with author).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
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parent alone, and other times, such as when then youth is over the age of
majority, the clinic represents the adult youth.289
Different questions concerning the model of special education
representation for a delinquency client arose for the law clinics at the
American University Washington College of Law. Law students in the
Disability Rights Law Clinic typically represent parents or other caregivers
in special education matters.290 In contrast, law students in the Criminal
Justice Clinic at the same law school represent youth in the role of defense
attorney in delinquency matters. Recently, the two clinics partnered on a
case in which the Criminal Justice Clinic first represented the child’s
expressed interests in the delinquency matter and the Disability Rights Law
Clinic took on representation of the child’s special education needs.
Because the two clinics are considered part of one umbrella law firm, the
Disability Rights Law Clinic decided to deviate from its typical model of
representation, in which the parent is the client, to represent the child’s
expressed interests in the special education matter, thereby maintaining
fidelity to the Criminal Justice Clinic’s agreed model of representation with
the child.291 If a due process hearing is required, the clinics will need to
determine whether it is possible to add the parent to the representation
without any concurrent conflict, or whether it would be preferable to
maintain sole representation of the child and argue that the child should be
deemed by the hearing officer to have legal capacity to bring a due process
complaint without his parent.
The process used by the Baltimore City Office of the Maryland Office of
the Public Defender results in two different models of special education
representation, as that organization has an in-house education attorney to
whom juvenile defense attorneys can refer special education matters, but
also uses an outside partner organization for some referrals.292 There are
four teams of juvenile defense attorneys at the Baltimore City Office, two
of which utilize in-house education counsel.293 Where an in-house attorney
handles the special education matter, the child is the client in the special
289. Id.
290. See DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW CLINIC, AM. UNIV. WASHINGTON COLL. OF LAW,

http://www.wcl.american.edu/clinical/disability.cfm (last visited Aug. 28, 2011)
(describing the types of matters that the clinic handles, including special education
matters).
291. The author currently teaches in the Disability Rights Law Clinic at the
Washington College of Law at American University, along with Robert Dinerstein,
Director of the Disability Rights Law Clinic and Director of the Clinical Program, and
the description of the joint case with the Criminal Justice Clinic is based on the
author’s own experience with that case.
292. E-mail from Abbie Flanagan, Attorney, Maryland Office of the Public
Defender, to Jamie Sparano, Student, American University Washington College of Law
(Feb. 9, 2011 14:13 EST) (on file with author).
293. Id.
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education case (as she is in the delinquency case), and the attorney will act
on the child’s expressed interests.294 Because the child is the client, and the
organization recognizes that the parent is the individual with the legal
capacity to bring a due process hearing, the in-house special education
attorney is unable to continue assisting on the special education matter if a
due process hearing is necessary.295 However, the in-house special
education attorney will assist in writing a complaint on behalf of a child to
the Maryland State Board of Education. In those instances, the parent and
child client must both agree with the decision to file the complaint;
otherwise, the organization withdraws from the special education
representation and continues to represent the child in the delinquency
matter only.296 The other two teams at the Baltimore City Office refer
special education cases to an external organization, the Maryland Disability
Law Center.297 The Maryland Disability Law Center signs a separate
retainer with the parent, who its attorneys represent exclusively, as the
Center has no obligation to align its model of representation with that of the
juvenile defense attorney, who represents the child’s expressed interests,
because the organizations are wholly separate.298
A different model of representation is used by the EdLaw Project in
Massachusetts, which accepts referrals from juvenile defense attorneys
with the Youth Advocacy Department, an initiative of the state’s public
defender office combining legal, clinical, and community outreach services
for court-involved youth.299 The EdLaw Project represents the expressed
interests of child clients300 and maintains fidelity to the child client’s
expressed interests for the most part, but the organization’s retainer
agreement does contemplate the possibility of withdrawal if the child’s
expressed interests conflict with the parent’s decisions or the attorney’s
advice.301 The retainer agreement reflects the complexity of sole
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. Such agreement is stated in the complaint itself, and a release from the

parent is attached.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Interview with Spanjaard, supra note 131.
300. E-mail from Marlies Spanjaard, Project Coordinator, The EdLaw Project,
Massachusetts, to Yael Cannon, Practitioner-in-Residence, American University
Washington College of Law (March 15, 2011, 11:28 EST) (on file with author). The
retainer used by the EdLaw Project emphasizes that the child’s expressed interests are
central, noting that “I understand that I am retaining The EdLaw Project to represent
my expressed wishes. If there is a conflict between my expressed wishes and those of
my parents, I understand and agree that The EdLaw Project is obligated to represent my
expressed wishes.” Id.
301. Id. However, there are some limitations on the pursuit of the child’s expressed
interests, as detailed in the retainer used by the EdLaw Project. Perhaps in recognition
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representation of a child in a special education matter.
Some juvenile courts provide for the appointment of special education
counsel for children involved in delinquency proceedings using different
models of representation. Attorneys who belong to the District of
Columbia Superior Family Court’s special education attorney panel, as
described above, can be appointed not only in child welfare cases, but in
delinquency cases as well. Although these attorneys typically represent
parents or other adults in special education matters,302 the relevant Attorney
Practice Standards provide that an attorney could represent both parent and
child if there is no conflict of interest, and suggest that this model of
representation might be particularly appropriate in a delinquency case,303
where the child’s liberty interests are at stake and her expressed interests
are critical.
The Los Angeles County Superior Court also provides for the
appointment of special education attorneys in delinquency cases, as in child
welfare cases. The court provides for the same model of representation in
either situation; the attorney is assigned to represent the best interests of the
child, while the parent, or educational rights holder, is there to act as an
agent.304 Where the attorney and educational rights holder disagree as to
the best educational interests of the child, the attorney may request a
hearing to resolve the conflict and may seek the appointment of a new
educational rights holder.305 Despite the importance of a child’s expressed
interests in a delinquency matter, the protocols do not require that a special
education attorney take direction from a child involved in delinquency
that a parent’s involvement is needed in educational decision-making in a special
education matter, the retainer also provides that “In the event a conflict arises under
this section which cannot be resolved, I understand that The EdLaw Project may
withdraw from representing me . . . . If I should decide not to follow my lawyer’s
advice concerning a major decision, in particular a decision that may be in conflict with
my parent(s) or which may require my lawyer to take steps he/she thinks are not
proper, The EdLaw Project may take necessary steps to withdraw from my case.”
Moreover, in addition to having the child sign the retainer, the EdLaw Project has a
parent or parents sign the retainer, indicating that the parent or parents “hereby retain
on behalf of my/our child [child’s name here], The EdLaw Project to represent my/our
son/daughter in connection with the matter(s) described in this Agreement.” The
complexity of the EdLaw Project retainer reflects the complexity of representation in
special education matters.
302. D.C. SPECIAL EDUCATION ATTORNEY STANDARDS, supra note 258, at 5.
303. Id. at 13.
304. See LOS ANGELES CNTY. APPOINTMENT OF EDUCATION ATTORNEY, supra note
253. (“The Attorney is appointed by the Court to represent the best educational
interests of the Minor, not those of the [Educational Rights Holder] . . . The educational
rights holder is functioning as the AGENT of the minor child. The [Educational Rights
Holder] is an agent of the minor child for purposes of special education advocacy in
that their participation in the attorney/client relationship is necessary and required in
the pursuit of such advocacy.”).
305. Id.
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proceedings. Both the courts in Los Angeles and the District of Columbia
require communication by the special education attorney with the juvenile
defense attorney, although the special education attorney in both
jurisdictions uses a different model of representation from the model used
by the juvenile defense attorney, who represents the child’s expressed
interests without any loyalty to the parent or relevance of a best-interests
analysis.306
Apart from pursuing separate special education representation, juvenile
defense attorneys may be able to use the delinquency proceeding to make
sure that a client’s special education needs are met, and in turn, use special
education arguments in furtherance of the child client’s goals in the
delinquency matter.307 Where clients have not received special education
services, delinquency attorneys can argue that an urgent educational
remedy is needed. Under delinquency court standards, a finding of
delinquency might entail a need for supervision,308 but a variety of special
education placements are available in both public and private settings that
could provide such supervision and serve as alternatives to detention or
incarceration.309 Accordingly, delinquency attorneys could argue that these
special education services satisfy any need for supervision that the court
would require and that they can address the child’s underlying needs,
thereby potentially keeping her out of a detention facility.310 Where a
306. D.C. SPECIAL EDUCATION ATTORNEY STANDARDS, supra note 258, at 16;
DELINQUENCY EDUCATION PROTOCOL 29 (Super. Ct. of D.C., Juv. Div. 2006).
307. Joseph B. Tulman, Disability and Delinquency: How Failures to Identify,
Accommodate, and Serve Youth with Education-Related Disabilities Lead to Their
Disproportionate Representation in the Delinquency System, 3 WHITTIER J. CHILD. &
FAM. ADVOC. 3, 45 (2003) [hereinafter Tulman, Disability and Delinquency]. Joseph
B. Tulman has been a strong proponent of using special education law an as alternative
strategy in court for delinquency cases.
308. Id. at 45.
309. Id.
310. Id. For example, under District of Columbia Superior Court Juvenile Rule
48(b), courts can dismiss cases and send juveniles to appropriate social agencies. A
special education placement could be considered one of these appropriate agencies.
Tulman, Best Defense, supra note 278, at 227-28. Further, delinquency attorneys can
attempt to discredit past offenses by arguing that the child was not receiving required
services in an appropriate educational placement. Tulman, Disability and Delinquency,
supra note 307, at 48. While these arguments might be made by the delinquency
attorney, a separate education attorney may also appear in court or submit a
memorandum regarding the client’s special education needs. At the Public Defender
Service for the District of Columbia, for example, special education attorneys attend
delinquency proceedings, schedules permitting, helping to ensure that the court
receives the most accurate information about a client’s special education needs. When
an education attorney is unable to appear in person, she may write a memorandum
providing the pertinent information in writing, which the juvenile defense attorney can
then present on behalf of the client. E-mail from Jamie Argento Rodriguez, supra note
281. Special education attorneys appointed in the District of Columbia are similarly
encouraged to collaborate with delinquency attorneys and appear in court to update
judges on the child’s special education needs. D.C. SPECIAL EDUCATION ATTORNEY
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youth is involved in a delinquency proceeding, special education
representation can provide great benefit and may result in the provision of
appropriate special education services for the youth in a less punitive or
restrictive setting.
K. Challenges in Obtaining Legal Representation in Special Education
Cases
Unfortunately, legal representation remains critical in some special
education matters, as school districts still frequently fail to meet their
obligations under the IDEA.311 Parents are often unaware of their rights, do
not see themselves as competent and equal team members, do not feel
confident about bringing due process complaints, and do not have the
ability to bring those complaints without legal assistance.312 Parents of
children with disabilities are often aware of “their own precarious social
and psychological status”313 and describe the “isolation, disrespect or
marginalization they experience at an IEP meeting.”314 These problems are
only compounded for families in high-poverty and minority
communities.315 When parents do seek redress through a due process
hearing, they are unlikely to prevail without an attorney.316 Parents have
had some success with lay advocacy, but more trained lay advocates are
needed to meet the demand317 and lay advocates are not always adequately
trained to navigate the complex legal structure of the IDEA, particularly
STANDARDS, supra note 280, at 13.
311. Wakelin, supra note 63, at 263; see Olga Pribyl, Leveling the Playing Field:
Helping Children with Special Education Needs, 23 CBA REC. 42, 43 (2009) (noting
that many students with disabilities are not identified as needing special education
services, parents can wait for months before obtaining evaluations, many students do
not have appropriate IEPs or the school does not fully implement the IEP, many
students with special education needs are unnecessarily segregated from their nondisabled peers, and students fail to receive necessary transition plans and services).
312. Massey & Rosenbaum, supra note 93, at 278-79.
313. See Rosenbaum, supra note 12, at 180 (explaining why a parent’s judgment
about what their children really need is affected by their own skepticism and mistrust).
314. Id. at 181.
315. Wakelin, supra note 63, at 263, 271.
316. A study of due process hearings in Illinois found that access to attorney
representation by parents significantly increases the likelihood of success. Parents who
were represented by attorneys prevailed in 50.4% of due process hearings, while nonrepresented parents prevailed only 16.8% of the time. MELANIE ARCHER, ACCESS AND
EQUITY IN THE DUE PROCESS SYSTEM: ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION AND HEARING
OUTCOMES
IN
ILLINOIS
1997-2002,
at
7
(2002),
available
at
http://dueprocessillinois.org/Access.pdf; see also Stefan R. Hanson, Buckhannon,
Special Education Disputes and Attorneys’ Fees: Time for a Congressional Response
Again, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 519, 548 (2003). School districts are represented by
attorneys 90% of the time, while parents are often left to fend for themselves. Pribyl,
supra note 311, at 42.
317. Lilliam Rangel-Diaz, Ensuring Access to the Legal System for Children and
Youth with Disabilities in Special Education Disputes, 27 HUM. RTS. 17, 19 (2000).
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where a due process hearing or a civil action in federal court might be
necessary. One parent opined that “there is no compliance unless the
family secures legal backup, and even then the district feels no urgency or
responsibility to comply.”318
However, for many parents, and especially for those from low-income
families, legal representation is not available for special education matters.
Very few lawyers have the knowledge or experience to represent families
in special education matters319 or are willing to take on these cases,320
especially given that they often involve “voluminous administrative
records, long administrative hearings, and specialized legal issues, without
a significant retainer.”321 Those lawyers who are willing to handle special
education matters are often too expensive for the average American.322
Although parents can obtain attorneys’ fees under the IDEA, those fees are
only available for prevailing parties, and some attorneys are not willing to
take the risk that they might not get paid for their work.323 Some legal
services organizations and law school clinical programs engage in special
education representation, but these services are typically only available to
those who qualify under the income guidelines.324 Even then, these
organizations are limited in resources, staff availability, case priorities and
service guidelines.325
318. See Rosenbaum, supra note 12, at 177 (citing E-mail to S.P., California school
district special education manager (Mar. 1, 2001) (on file with author)).
319. AM. BAR ASS’N, NONLAWYER PRACTICE, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY IN LAWRELATED SITUATIONS: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (1995), available at
http://www.paralegals.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=338#One.
320. See Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Reg’l Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 247, 257 n.9 (1st Cir.
2003) (emphasizing that in 2002, Michigan had only nine private attorneys who
represented parents in due process hearings, while Rhode Island had only six,
Wisconsin had ten, Texas had twenty-nine, and Arizona had only one.); see also Brief
for Autism Society of America et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9,
Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007) (No. 05983); Wakelin, supra note 63, at 282.
321. Collingsru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 1998).
322. M. Brendhan Flynn, Note, In Defense of Maroni: Why Parents Should Be
Allowed to Proceed Pro Se in IDEA Cases, 80 IND. L.J. 881, 901 (2005).
323. Wakelin, supra note 63, at 277.
324. Brief for the Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates Inc., et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8-9, Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City
Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007) (No. 05-983).
325. Wakelin, supra note 63, at 277; see also Maroni, 346 F.3d at 257 n.9
(discussing the scarcity of representation available to families seeking assistance with
special education matters, including the inability of federally funded Protection and
Advocacy organizations to meet the high demand for special education representation).
The First Circuit Court noted that DRC, which is New Hampshire’s Protection and
Advocacy Agency (P&A), reported that it could provide full representation in only 35
of 390 special education inquiries in 2002. Other P&As report similar shortages
nationwide. Since 2000, Alaska’s P&A provided representation in only 183 of 1,092
requests for help in special education matters, and Arizona’s P&A did so in only 300 of
4,800 cases. Since October 1999, Michigan’s P&A handled only 840 out of 6,015
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In some cases, the best alternative to common representation, especially
where a conflict between the parent and child exists or is likely to arise, is
for each party to have separate representation. However, in many
jurisdictions, it is extremely difficult to find attorneys who will take special
education cases, especially at a low cost or at no cost, despite the
availability of attorneys’ fees for prevailing parties.326 It may be difficult
enough to secure one special education attorney for a family; the possibility
of identifying and securing separate legal representation for the parent and
child will often simply not be possible. Due to the scarcity of special
education lawyers and the high cost usually required to secure such
representation, withdrawal can have serious consequences and should be
avoided whenever possible.
Withdrawal will often result in no
representation at all for the family, and withdrawal can be especially
difficult for children, as they have more difficulty than adults in
understanding the attorney role and trusting the nature of the
relationship.327 The costs of separate representation, the consequences of
withdrawal should there be an irresolvable conflict during joint
representation, and the possible inability to secure separate representation
are factors that the attorney and affected clients should consider in
determining whether common representation is in the clients’ interests.328
The scarcity of legal resources weighs in favor of joint representation in
order to ensure that both parent and child have counsel, but the possibility
of withdrawal as a result of an irresolvable conflict argues for
representation of one individual, especially where such a conflict is more
likely.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Consider Legal and Ethical Implications of Possible Models of
Representation and Thoughtfully Identify the Client or Clients Using a
Contextualized, Individualized Approach
With each potential client family, attorneys should consider the various
models of representation they might use, with a contextualized analysis of
the factors described above, to assess the legal and ethical implications of
education-related requests. Massachusetts’s P&A provides representation in less than
10% of special education cases, and Wisconsin’s P&A does so in about 25% of cases
that it deems meritorious. In New York, one full-time and one part-time attorney
handle over 2,000 requests for help in special education cases.
326. See Brief of Autism Society of America et. al. as Amici Curaie in Support of
Petitioner at 11, Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City School District, 550 U.S.
516 (2007) (No. 05-983), 2006 WL 3735956.
327. Godsoe, All in the Family, supra note 20, at 36.
328. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 19 (2011).
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each possible model. Attorneys should evaluate each case individually,
rather than using a stock model of representation for every case, due to the
complexities discussed throughout this Article that might lead to a
preference for a particular model over another in certain circumstances. A
one-size-fits-all approach might result in obstacles during the course of
representation that could have been avoided if the model of representation
were tailored to the situation.
If the attorney wishes to represent a minor student exclusively, without
including the parent in the attorney-client relationship, the attorney will
need to research and reach a conclusion as to the student-client’s rights in
the special education context. The attorney will need to advise the student
about the scope of these rights and the possible limitations on the student’s
right to make her own educational decisions, such as consent to evaluations
or services, or her legal capacity to independently bring suit on her own
behalf while she is still a minor. Even if the attorney determines that the
student does not possess educational decision-making authority or
procedural rights in the special education context, the attorney could still
represent the student with the understanding that the attorney will not be
able to proceed with litigation on the student’s behalf, but will articulate the
student’s wishes and try to persuade the IEP team members on behalf of the
student. If the attorney represents the child exclusively, but the parent is
involved in the IEP process and takes action through litigation contrary to
the child’s wishes, it remains unresolved whether students can initiate
administrative proceedings against their parents or school boards if their
parents failed to adequately represent their interests or ignored their wishes
in developing their IEPs,329 but the child’s attorney should prepare
arguments in support of the child’s legal capacity to sue and her
independent rights under the IDEA.
An attorney should think through any risks or challenges inherent in joint
representation before entering into such an arrangement. If a lawyer is
considering representation of both the parent and student or of multiple
caregivers, a standard conflicts of interests analysis is necessary to decide
whether to enter into joint representation in the first place and if joint
representation is pursued, what will happen if the clients disagree during
the course of representation.330
When an attorney chooses a model of representation that includes a
parent or other caregiver, the attorney must ensure that the individual falls
under the IDEA definition of a parent. An attorney interested in providing
special education representation in connection with a child for whom the

329. Russo, supra note 191, at 15.
330. Moore, supra note 1, at 1824.
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parents are unknown or cannot be located, a child who is a ward of the
state, or a child who is unaccompanied and homeless, should research state
laws, regulations and court rules to understand who may be appointed to
serve as a surrogate parent for the child. The attorney should work with the
appropriate entity—whether it be the state or local educational agency, a
child welfare agency, or a court—to ensure that a qualified individual is
appointed as a surrogate if the child requires one and no individual has yet
been identified.331 Where a surrogate or foster parent who does not know
the child very well or at all serves in the parental role, the attorney should
involve the child in the representation, or at least communicate closely with
the child through the course of the representation, to ensure that the
attorney is seeing the whole picture. Similarly, due to the unique needs of
a child involved in the delinquency system, whose liberty interests are at
stake, and the potential implications for the delinquency case as a result of
the special education advocacy, a special education attorney should
consider representation of the child in that situation or at least extensive
involvement of the child in the legal case.
As the attorney explores these various factors in determining the
appropriate model of representation, the attorney should involve the family
members in the assessment. Each family member may have a vision for
the representation that could assist the attorney in working with the family
to select a model of representation that will work for everyone.
B. Clear Communication of Model of Representation and Any Potential or
Actual Conflicts
Once a model is chosen, the attorney should discuss the model of
representation that will be used with all parties, and ensure that all parties
understand who will be serving in the client role and directing the
representation. Especially given that there is often confusion about the role
of the attorney in legal matters involving children,332 clarity should be
provided from the outset as to the role of the parent, and the role of the
child, if any, in the attorney-client relationship. The retainer agreement
provides an important opportunity to clarify and memorialize the
relationship in writing, as well as a jumping-off point for a conversation
reviewing the relationship that has been determined.
While carefully explaining from the start who is the client and whose
331. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(23) (2006). If an individual who seeks the attorney’s
representation is serving in the role of a surrogate, but has not been officially
appointed, the attorney should research and investigate to determine whether that
individual requires any sort of formal appointment as a surrogate in order to proceed as
a decision-maker. The person may not require formal appointment as a surrogate if she
meets the definition of a parent under the IDEA, as noted above.
332. See generally Buss, supra note 21, at 1699.
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interests will govern the course of litigation,333 the lawyer should discuss
fully any limitations on the scope of the representation, especially when
establishing or adjusting an existing relationship between clients.334 A
special education attorney should be prepared to clarify who is the client
should there be confusion, not only within the relationship, but also with
other individuals, as to whom the attorney represents. Sometimes parents
and other individuals, such as school officials, medical professionals,
hearing officers, and judges, assume that a special education attorney
represents the parent.
An attorney must think through the risks and potential disadvantages of
joint representation and, when selecting such a model, stay alert to
changing circumstances, bring any developing conflicts to the attention of
clients, and be prepared to withdraw in the event that the positions of the
clients become fundamentally antagonistic.335
Attorneys may miss
conflicts or feel reluctant to discuss them out of a desire to maintain family
harmony.336 In many situations, conflicts between multiple special
education clients can be mediated and resolved. However, because
conflicts that are unresolvable may sometimes arise, close consideration
should be given to the attorney’s ethical responsibilities before proceeding
with a model of representation in which the attorney represents more than
one parent or both the parent and student.
C. Maximize the Voice of the Client (and Minimize the Lawyer’s Voice)
Regardless of whether an attorney represents the parent, child, or both,
she should avoid any model of representation or action within the
representation that promotes the voice of the lawyer over that of the client
or clients. The lawyer should not act in what the lawyer determines to be
the client’s best interests,337 unless required by a court or other similar
authority, because this model promotes the voice of the lawyer at the
expense of the voice of the parent and child. Even where an attorney is not

333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

See Mickenberg, supra note 57, at 632.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 32 (2011).
Moore, supra note 1, at 1839-40.
Godsoe, All in the Family, supra note 20, at 18.
See Petrera, supra note 2, at 546 (“Some commentators argue that a lawyerclient relationship with the child casts the parent as the enemy. Others argue that the
role of the lawyer is not to decide the best interests of the child. Courts and
commentators, however, ‘have often and overwhelmingly rejected the idea that a
lawyer should act in what the lawyer determines is the client’s “best interests.”’
Indeed, the most obvious role of the parent throughout the course of representation is to
decide what is in the best interests of the child-client . . . the parent should remain an
integral part of the representation.”) (citing Daniel L. Bray & Michael D. Ensley,
Dealing with the Mentally Incapacitated Client: The Ethical Issues Facing the
Attorney, 33 FAM. L.Q. 329, 340 (1999)).
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expressly using a best interests model, she may feel tempted to act on her
views rather than her client’s. For example, an attorney may view a
client’s decision that accords with her own professional judgment as
properly considered; in contrast, she may view a divergent decision by the
parent or child as evidence of irrationality, stress, or impaired decisionmaking,338 and feel inclined to take the course of action she views as best.
The lawyer should consider whether the problem is one of information,
given that educating and counseling the client can remedy information
deficiencies.339 Clients might make uninformed decisions or yield their
decision-making power because no one has taken the time to improve their
capacities and opportunities for decision-making in the special education
system in the past and the lawyer has failed to take care to avoid the same
mistake.340
Especially where clients may have been silenced by
antagonistic school officials or other professionals and may be ill-equipped
to speak up assertively and knowledgeably in such a complex legal system,
attorneys need to actively ensure that they avoid becoming judge, jury, and
ultimate decision-maker in a case.341 With patience and effective
communication, a lawyer can help a client overcome a temporary
incapacity, a gap in knowledge, or a lack of training to become a
participatory client.342 Intensive counseling and frequent contact can help
the client to develop enough trust in the lawyer and obtain needed
information to achieve an effective and typical attorney-client
relationship.343
Especially where the child is the client, attorneys should take special
care to avoid imposing their own views in a best interests model and
instead use an expressed interests model whenever possible. If an attorney
anticipates that a child will have limited capacity to direct the
representation, the attorney should consider including an individual who
meets the definition of an IDEA parent as a client to avoid a result in which
the lawyer is taking protective action, such as practically driving the
decisions
by
making
best-interests
or
substituted-judgment
determinations.344 Should the attorney decide not to include the parent as a
client where the child is unable to direct the representation, the attorney
should use a substituted-judgment model rather than a best-interests model
to make a decision based on what the individual in that situation would
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Herr, supra note 143, at 621.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 641.
Id. at 650.
Id.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2011).
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want rather than what the attorney wants for the individual. The
substituted-judgment model may provide some limitation on the lawyer’s
own personal influence over the course of the legal case, which is more
unfettered when a best-interests standard is used.
Especially because parents are vested with educational decision-making
rights both constitutionally and under the IDEA, a model that maximizes
the lawyer’s control over decisions results in substantial
disenfranchisement of the parent.345 Although the child—or the attorney—
may have divergent views from the parent, an attorney representing a
parent exclusively should in most situations maintain loyalty to the parentclient’s expressed interests so as not to disenfranchise the parent and her
legal rights under the Constitution and the IDEA.
D. Involve and Empower Both Parent and Child Wherever Possible
Without Compromising Loyalty to Client
In deciding whether to formally include the child as a client, the attorney
should consider that participation of a child in legal representation that
directly affects her can inform strategic decision-making and client
counseling by the attorney by bringing to light information that
professionals miss.346 Attorneys should also note that the voice of the child
is especially important where the attorney is representing an appointed
surrogate or foster parent who knows little about a child involved in the
child welfare system or what might be the best decision for her. The
child’s voice may also be of particular significance where her rights as a
criminal defendant, and a corresponding risk of incarceration, might be
implicated in a related delinquency matter. Involvement in child welfare or
delinquency proceedings weighs in favor of including the child in some
way in the client role.
However, the importance of parental rights under the Constitution, the
centrality of parental rights under the IDEA, and limitations on a minor’s
independent legal capacity to sue in a special education due process hearing
or civil action in federal court, argue in favor of including the parent in the
representation. Perhaps for these reasons and due to the challenges
involved in representation of a minor, the most common model of special
education representation is one in which the parent, as defined by the
IDEA, is the sole client, without any involvement from the student in
directing the attorney-client relationship. If this model is chosen, the
attorney should remember that the student is still the subject of the
representation and literally at the heart of the matter.347 Although the
345. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (2006).
346. Margulies, supra note 163, at 1482.
347. It is possible that Comment 4 to Model Rule 1.14 could be read as creating

CANNON 9/15/2011

74

12/8/2011 12:49:08 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 20:1

parent’s wishes would control under this model of representation, the
attorney should spend time with the child and get to know her. With the
parent-client’s agreement, the attorney should still communicate with the
child and involve her in the representation in informal ways, while
maintaining clarity with all parties about the parent’s role as the ultimate
decision-maker in regards to the representation.
There are a number of ways that the attorney can involve the child in the
case, regardless of whether or not the child is a client. Foremost, it is
always helpful for a special education attorney to interact with the child,
and try to understand the child’s frustrations, needs, wishes, strengths and
interests.348 The attorney should seek out as much information as possible
from the child to assist in understanding the legal violations and developing
an appropriate educational program. If the child is very young or severely
disabled and unable to communicate, some observation of the child and
interaction with the child in any way possible will still yield important
information and remind the lawyer who will be receiving and benefiting
from the services for which the attorney is advocating.349 If the child is
able to communicate, either through traditional speech or with assistance
from an adult or assistive technology, the attorney should interview the
child. Attorneys gain an understanding of the student’s strengths and needs
from such a conversation unequaled by a review of documents describing
the student.350 An interview of the student, even where the parent is the
client, provides the attorney with important information necessary not only
in building the factual evidentiary record in a special education matter, but
in helping the parent-client to determine the appropriate remedies to pursue
and the course of action to achieve those remedies. When interviewing a
some potential or actual duty to prevent or correct action adverse to the interests of
non-client minors where the attorney represents the minor’s guardian. See Godsoe, All
in the Family, supra note 20, at 15. This duty might not be applicable to a situation in
which an attorney represents a parent or other caregiver in a special education matter
because the parent has educational decision-making rights in the special education case
and corrective action might be based on a subjective determination by the attorney who
is imposing her own views that the parent’s actions are adverse to the child’s. The
comment states, “If the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from the ward, and is
aware that the guardian is acting adversely to the ward’s interest, the lawyer may have
an obligation to prevent or rectify the guardian’s misconduct.” MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 4. It is not clear that the comment would refer to a
parent and child rather than a court-appointed guardian, or similarly that it would
follow that attorneys in special education cases have any duty to non-client children of
their parent clients.
348. See Joseph B. Tulman, Investigating and Initiating the Special Education Case,
in SPECIAL EDUCATION ADVOCACY UNDER THE IDEA FOR CHILDREN IN THE JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY SYSTEM 7-4 (Joseph B. Tulman & Joyce A. McGee eds., 1998).
349. Petrera, supra note 2, at 550 (“Even if the child is not capable of actively
participating in the representation, the lawyer gains a wealth of information simply by
observing the child for a moment.”).
350. Cannon & Rinaldi, supra note 126, at 34-35.
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child, lawyers may need to vary their interviewing techniques as a result of
any special circumstances, including any cognitive limitations, age
limitations, or emotional or psychological limitations.351
To conduct an effective interview of the child, the attorney may want to
review some of the extensive research on interviewing children.352 While
much of this literature focuses on the child welfare and criminal justice
contexts, many of the principles remain the same.353 For example, openended questions are preferable because closed-ended questions tend to lead
children to respond with no more information than the answer requires.354
It is also important to give the child plenty of time to respond to questions,
particularly at the beginning of the interview.355 Especially if a student’s
special education needs are not being met, school may be an unpleasant
topic.356 “Wait-time,” in which children are allowed plenty of time to think
about a question before an assumption is made that they do not know the
answer, can be effective in enabling the child to build up the courage to
discuss even difficult subjects.357
In addition to interviewing the child, whether that child is a client or not,
an attorney should also involve her in the legal case, where appropriate and
applicable, by including her in IEP meetings, taking her to visit potential
school placements, and involving her in any placement decisions.358 An
351.
352.
353.
354.

ELLMANN ET AL., supra note 36, at 113.
Cannon & Rinaldi, supra note 126, at 34.
Id.
Thomas D. Lyon, Investigative Interviewing of the Child, in CHILD WELFARE
LAW AND PRACTICE: REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS AND STATE AGENCIES IN
ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY CASES 2-3 (D.N. Duquette & A.M. Haralambie
eds., 2010) [hereinafter Lyon, Investigative Interviewing of the Child].
355. Id.
356. Cannon & Rinaldi, supra note 126, at 34.
357. Lyon, Investigative Interviewing of the Child, supra note 354, at 13. Attorneys
may want to consult the Handbook on Questioning Children (ABA Handbook)
produced by the American Bar Association Center on Children on the Law, which
provides guidance for interviewing children in different development stages. For
example, the book cautions that even adolescents between the ages of eleven and
eighteen may not have acquired adult narrative skills, may not understand time as a
historical concept and are likely to lose track of long, complex questions. ANNE
GRAFFAM WALKER, HANDBOOK ON QUESTIONING CHILDREN: A LINGUISTIC
PERSPECTIVE 4-5 (2d ed. 1999). While some of these materials on interviewing
children, such as the ABA Handbook, provide guidance to attorneys based on a child’s
age range, children with disabilities may not have reached the developmental
milestones and, therefore, information for attorneys in these materials that are based on
age or age range may not be applicable to every child. Therefore, attorneys should
avoid making assumptions about the capabilities and capacity of a student before
beginning an interview and try to garner from other sources prior to the interview and
from the student at the start of the interview the student’s actual communication
abilities. Cannon & Rinaldi, supra note 126, at 34. Regardless, the use of active
listening and openness of mind can assist the lawyer in understanding a child or
adolescent client. ELLMANN, supra note 36, at 113.
358. Especially if the student is an adolescent and able to communicate, she may
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attorney should also educate the child about her legal rights under special
education law more generally, and more specifically about what is
happening in the case and the various courses of action that could be taken.
Counseling the child about possible courses of action, and soliciting
feedback from her about her goals and preferences can prove critical in
developing a strong legal case and in ensuring buy-in from the very
individual who will have to live with the consequences of the attorney’s
advocacy. Children who are not consulted about their educational
placements will be less likely to succeed in those placements; it is clear that
both the parent and child need to be engaged for the child’s educational
placement to work.359 For example, the child may not attend or feel
engaged at school if he is not involved in the advocacy process; in contrast,
a child can reap procedural justice benefits from involvement in the
representation, whether formally as a client or informally, leading to more
educational success.360 The child can also be involved in a due process
hearing; indeed, sometimes the testimony of a child before a hearing officer
can prove quite compelling, especially if she is well-prepared by the
attorney to take the stand. Even where the child is not included in the
client role, the lawyer can provide her a voice in the special education case
in these ways, without compromising loyalty to the parent. Providing the
child with a voice “implies participation, and a sense that others value
one’s opinions and sentiments,”361 which can empower the child to express
and advocate for herself both in the course of the case and in the long
term.362
When the attorney decides to represent the child exclusively, the attorney
should maintain a typical lawyer-client relationship with the child client363
and not minimize the child’s role. The lawyer can also take steps to
enhance the child’s capacity through input from various sources such as the
child, her family and peers, and professionals who have worked with the
participate in IEP meetings or otherwise voice her opinions as to her educational needs.
See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(vii) (2006) (providing that a student is a member
of the IEP team whenever appropriate).
359. Godsoe, All in the Family, supra note 20, at 15, 41 (explaining that the failure
to interview the child in a special education case “results both in a failure to gain
valuable information about the case, and, often, worse outcomes-children who are not
consulted about their educational placement will be less likely to succeed in it”).
360. Id.
361. Margulies, supra note 163, at 1482.
362. Empowerment of a child who has been struggling in school is especially
important, given that such children are often already in a very disempowered state.
Petrera, supra note 2, at 550.
363. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a) (2010). Even a client with a
diminished capacity, whether due to age or disability, “often has the ability to
understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client’s
own well-being.” Id. at R. 1.14 cmt. 1.
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child and through the lawyer’s sensitivity to race, disability, and gender.364
Additionally, the attorney can effectively involve the child by
communicating with her in a developmentally appropriate way that
accounts for the child’s age, level of education, cultural context, and degree
of language acquisition.365 The lawyer should counsel the child effectively
by explaining clearly, precisely and in terms she can understand the
meaning and consequences of any action, thereby affording the child a
chance to provide informed guidance to the lawyer and, consequently, a
voice.366
Even where the child is the sole client, a lawyer should still engage the
parent or caregiver, if that person is involved in the child’s life and willing
to participate, throughout the course of the representation. In order to
effectively advocate for the child, because the parent’s educational
decision-making rights are so central under the IDEA, “the dynamics of
special education representation must incorporate a parent’s right to decide
their child’s education.”367 Involvement of a parent can also assist the
attorney in forming a more effective working relationship with the childclient. The parent can offer emotional support to the client and practical
guidance to the lawyer.368 Because parents have usually developed a
system for communication with a child who might have difficulty
communicating with others, a parent can help to facilitate communication
between the parent and child and, where needed, can serve as a “translator”
of sorts in situations where the lawyer has difficulty understanding the
child or the child has difficulty understanding the lawyer.369
If the child is the attorney’s sole client in the matter and the attorney
involves the parents and interacts with them during the course of the case in
these ways, the lawyer should still work to maintain the centrality of the
child’s voice. For example, in some cases, an attorney might involve the
364. Margulies, supra note 163, at 1476.
365. Gail Chang Bohr, Ethics and the Standards of Practice for the Representation

of Children in Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 989, 997
(2006).
366. Id. at 997-98.
367. Petrera, supra note 2, at 541.
368. Herr, supra note 143, at 614.
369. Note that the attorney should account for any impact on attorney-client
confidentiality that might result from involving the parent in facilitating
communication. Under Model Rule 1.14, where a third party is there simply to assist
in facilitating communication between the parent and child, it is possible that attorneyclient confidentiality may be maintained between the lawyer and the child because it
might extend to the parent in that situation. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14
cmt. 3. The client may wish to have family members or other persons participate in
discussions with the lawyer. When necessary to assist in the representation, the
presence of such persons generally does not affect the applicability of the attorneyclient evidentiary privilege. See id.
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parents so that they may serve as a next friend in a due process complaint
or civil action, but the child is the exclusive client for purposes of the
attorney-client relationship. In that case, the attorney should ensure that the
parents are willing to defer to the child to take the lead role in directing the
representation and empower the child to make critical decisions. Similarly,
if a parent is exclusively serving in the client role, but the attorney involves
the child and interacts with her in any of these ways, the attorney should
remember that the parent is the client and ultimate decision-maker. Where
the parent is the client, her decisions should determine the course of action
that the attorney takes, even if the child disagrees. Where one individual or
another is the sole client, loyalty to that client should remain paramount.
CONCLUSION
The model of representation used by an attorney in a special education
matter should not be taken for granted. Instead, thoughtful consideration of
the relevant factors discussed in this Article should inform the decision.
Especially when attorneys are deliberate in shaping the model of
representation in a special education case and involving both the parents
and the student, regardless of the selected model, attorneys can be uniquely
positioned to empower all family members with which they interact in
ways that can have a lasting positive impact. The recommendations in this
Article are designed with an eye towards the empowerment of the entire
family in a special education case.
Lawyers should remember that their clients will continue to be a part of
the special education system beyond the life of the legal case, as well as
other bureaucratic and legal systems to which low-income families and/or
families with children with disabilities are subject during the child’s school
years and into adulthood. In the chaos and rush of practice, many lawyers
have little time to assist with their clients’ personal growth.370 However,
children with disabilities may be uniquely in need of knowledge, skills, and
training to empower them to function not only as participatory, assertive
clients during the course of the attorney-client relationship,371 but as
participatory, assertive actors in these bureaucratic systems throughout
their lives. Similarly, parents of a child with a disability could benefit from
such training as a means of empowerment. Clients who actively participate
in their special education cases are not only more likely to get better results
in those cases,372 but can become more effectively armed to advocate on
their own behalf even when the instant legal case has concluded.

370. Herr, supra note 143, at 639.
371. Id.
372. Id.
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Selection of a model of representation may present particular challenges
and should be evaluated thoughtfully in each special education case
through a contextualized approach. Regardless of the model chosen,
however, an attorney should involve both the child and parents in the legal
case wherever possible by educating them, counseling them, and providing
them with a voice, thereby empowering them to become better selfadvocates throughout their lives.

